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THE SUM OF ITS PARTS:   
THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP  
IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
Jeremy R. McClane 
 
A question often posed of the legal profession is what (if any) value lawyers 
add to the endeavors of their clients. However, this framing of the question 
ignores the fact that lawyers do not add value in a vacuum, but only through 
effective collaboration with their clients.  This Article therefore addresses the 
question of lawyers' value by examining the working relationship between a 
lawyer and his or her client. As a lens I analyze one of the most important 
types of capital markets deals in a company’s existence: its initial public 
offering (IPO) of company stock. Drawing on data from interviews with 
equity capital markets lawyers at major law firms, and analyzing data from 
IPOs in the United States registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission between June 1996 and December 2010, this study finds a 
strong association between several measures of IPO performance and the 
familiarity between the lead underwriter and its counsel, as measured by the 
number of times a particular law firm serves as counsel to a managing 
underwriter within a relatively short time period. Performance is gauged 
according to a stock’s opening day returns, price performance over thirty, 
sixty, and ninety trading days, correct price revision, litigation rates, and the 
speed at which deals are completed. I also analyze the relationships between 
the lawyers for the lead underwriter and the lawyers for the issuer. The 
analysis shows some benefits from familiarity, albeit generally smaller than 
those associated with the underwriter-lawyer relationship. In all cases, the 
positive effects of repeated interaction diminish the further back in time the 
previous collaborations occurred.  I also show that the relationships between 
familiarity and deal quality occur independently of the level of the lawyers’ 
experience.  
 These findings support the conclusion that lawyers’ relational skill can  
positively influence deal outcomes, independent even of substance and  
process knowledge. I hypothesize that the core advantage of repeated 
interaction is the formation of more effective lawyer-client team dynamics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To what extent does familiarity among lawyers, and between lawyers and 
their clients, impact the outcome of a deal, even independently of the 
lawyers’ expertise?  The question is significant given that clients frequently 
choose their counsel based, at least in part, on relationships and past 
experiences with counsel.1  The question is also important as part of the 
ongoing discussion of what value lawyers add for clients generally.2  In a 
 
 1. See, e.g., John C. Coates et al., Hiring Team, Firms and Lawyers:  Evidence of the 
Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1028–
30 (2011) (finding that in-house legal counsel rely on relationships and prior experience with 
law firms when selecting counsel). 
 2. For one of the more famous articulations of, and answers to, that question, see Ronald 
J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:  Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 
239 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value Creation]. 
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transactional setting, as in many others, lawyers do not perform their work in 
isolation, but in concert with clients and other parties who shepherd 
transactions to completion.3  The output of a transaction is a collective work 
product, and therefore, an inquiry of what value lawyers add cannot be 
disentangled from an inquiry of what value can be created through effective 
working relationships amongst lawyers and clients.4  And while many would 
agree that there are intangible benefits from familiarity, it is not obvious that 
lawyers’ relationships with clients or other counsel would add any 
quantifiable value to the handling of a matter.  Indeed, familiarity might just 
as easily destroy value if it causes lawyers to take a client relationship for 
granted, makes a law firm difficult to fire because of interpersonal concerns, 
or interferes with counsel’s ability to make objective judgments about the 
client’s issues. 
This Article reports the initial findings of a research program to study the 
working relationships between lawyers and their clients, as well as lawyers 
and their opposing counsel, in the transactional setting.  The study focuses 
on a particular type of transaction—the initial public offering (IPO) of a 
company’s stock—and draws upon data from interviews with equity capital 
markets practitioners who work on such deals, as well as publicly available 
data on deal performance. 
The results provide evidence that the quality of the working relationship 
between a lawyer and his or her client, as well as relationships between a 
lawyer and the counsel on the other side of the transaction, have a significant 
positive impact on deal performance in the context of IPOs.  The study adds 
to the literature about the nature of lawyers’ relationships with their clients5 
and is the first to provide quantitative evidence of the benefits a good working 
relationship can yield in a transactional setting. 
To provide this evidence, I analyze the impact of repeated collaborations 
between managing underwriters and the various legal counsel they employ 
in the IPO process, as a proxy of better working relationships.  I also analyze 
the impact of repeated interactions between different sets of counsel on IPO 
transactions within a relatively short period.  I find a strong association 
between the number of times a particular law firm and bank work together 
 
 3. See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Producing Information:  Initial Public Offerings, 
Production Costs, and the Producing Lawyer, 74 OR. L. REV. 275, 285–86 (1995) (describing 
a theory of IPO transactions in which lawyers act as one part of a larger endeavor by bankers, 
accountants, and other parties to produce information). 
 4. See Jon R. Katzenbach & Douglas K. Smith, The Discipline of Teams, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 111, 112 (describing team outputs as “a collective work-product 
reflect[ing] the joint, real contribution of team members”). 
 5. See, e.g., Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1000 (reporting the results of a survey of 
corporate in-house counsel finding that large companies keep a stable of preferred law firms 
to provide services; that relationships are important to selection of counsel; and that clients 
focus on teams and departments, as well as entire firms and individuals, in choosing firms); 
David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?  Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client 
Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2010) (arguing that the relationship between 
corporate counsel and corporate clients resembles a strategic alliance or partnership more than 
an agency relationship). 
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within the preceding one, two, and three years and better deal outcomes, as 
gauged by a stock’s opening day returns and price performance over thirty, 
sixty, and ninety trading days, as well as the time to completion of each deal.  
The impact on stock performance decreases the further back in time 
successive lawyer-client interactions go.  To rule out selection, I perform an 
analysis using smaller samples of only the most prestigious and experienced 
banks and perform other tests on subsets of the data that exclude observations 
that could plausibly be the product of selection.  I also show that frequent 
interaction between lawyers and their clients is associated with deals that are 
more accurately priced (as indicated by increasingly faster deal completion 
from the filing date of the preliminary prospectus).  In addition, I show that 
relational effects as proxied by repeated interactions impact deal outcomes 
independently of the experience of the lawyers involved. 
These findings provide evidence that lawyers’ familiarity and relational 
skill can positively influence deal outcomes, independent even of their level 
of experience with regard to substantive legal expertise.  I hypothesize that 
the core advantage of repeated interaction is the generation of trust and 
familiarity, leading to more effective lawyer-client team dynamics.  That 
explanation is consistent with research on teams indicating that repeated 
interaction among team members fosters lower error rates and better team 
outputs,6 as well as the accounts of practicing lawyers gleaned from 
interviews.  The basic conclusion to which the literature points is that 
frequent collaboration is a product of frequent interaction, and groups who 
collaborate form better teams.  Better teamwork in turn produces overall 
better performance in the negotiation of capital markets transactions, leading 
to better information product, more efficient allocation of marketing efforts, 
and ultimately better stock performance.  The broader implication of this for 
transactional lawyers seeking to leverage their skills more effectively is that 
the model of lawyer-client relationship in transactions should be reimagined 
to reflect less the dynamics of principal and agent and more the dynamics of 
a team. 
This research brings a previously unexplored perspective to the study of 
securities law and transactional lawyering.  To date, despite a large body of 
research on IPO transactions7 and the role of lawyers in deal making,8 no 
studies have sought to explore the impact of collaboration on IPO deals.  
 
 6. See J. Richard Hackman, Why Teams Don’t Work, in THEORY AND RESEARCH ON 
SMALL GROUPS 245, 250 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 1998) (discussing research on teams 
indicating that repeated team interactions lead to lower rates of error, among other things). 
 7. See, e.g., B. Espen Eckbo et al., Security Offerings, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE:  EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 275–355 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (reviewing 
the voluminous empirical finance literature on IPOs). 
 8. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers As Transaction Cost Engineers, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 508–14 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter Gilson, Transaction Cost Engineers]; Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 2, at 
240–44; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword:  Business Lawyers and Value 
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (1995) [hereinafter Gilson & Mnookin, Business 
Lawyers]. 
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Scholarship in the past several decades has supported the idea that 
cooperation among lawyers would be beneficial to both clients and society 
as a whole, and much research has focused on finding ways to foster it in the 
legal profession.9  However, implications of this for the quality of working 
relationships between the various parties involved in a group production 
process like an IPO have not been explored.10 
Because the goal is to explore individuals’ interactions, and by extension 
the familiarity among the lawyers and bankers conducting deals, I limit the 
time frames to the one year, two years, and three years preceding each deal.  
I gather data from interviews with professionals in law firms, investment 
banks, and institutional investment firms to understand their perceptions of 
the impact of familiarity and to supplement the statistical analysis by 
unpacking the causal mechanisms and meanings that the numbers do not 
reveal.  I examine a number of outcome-related variables for which data is 
available, including price performance, informational completeness 
(evidenced by disclosure), probability of securities litigation, length of time 
from the initiation of the deal to the offering date, and decimal versus integer 
pricing (an indicator of a well negotiated final price).  I control for a number 
of other factors that affect performance commonly employed in the literature 
on IPOs.  Appendix Figure A sets out the variables analyzed and standard 
controls used. 
Figure 1 below represents the relationship present in the raw data between 
the IPO stock’s performance on the first day of trading (the first day 
“bounce”) and the number of times in the preceding year an underwriter has 
collaborated with its counsel, as well as the number of times the two sets of 
law firms involved in the deal have encountered each other working on an 
IPO.  As Figure 1 illustrates, repeated interactions bear a linear relationship 
to an incrementally increasing opening day bounce.  The pattern remains in 
 
 9. See, e.g., Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents 
Enhance Cooperation?  Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 331–33 (1997) 
(examining experimentally the impact of lawyer reputational concerns in improving 
cooperation); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:  
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 550 (1994) 
[hereinafter Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents]; see also James K.L. Lawrence, 
Collaborative Lawyering:  A New Development in Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 431, 431–35 (2002) (discussing the professionalization of collaborative lawyering 
approaches).  The type of cooperation that these studies deal with is distinct from teamwork, 
as it is used in this Article.  Cooperation, as used in other research, refers to the lawyers on 
opposite sides of litigation revealing information and working to come to a swift resolution 
for their clients. See Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra, at 550.  Teamwork 
includes cooperation but goes beyond it, encompassing the working relationships between all 
parties, including the lawyers, clients, and other outside experts, largely subsuming 
adversarialism in pursuit of a common goal. 
 10. Cf. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (defining team production as 
“production in which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of 
separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all resources used in team 
production belong to one person”). 
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regression analyses controlling for factors that may also influence the first 
day bounce, as detailed below. 
The trend in first day bounce has mixed implications but is generally a 
positive result for the underwriter and its counsel.  A large first day price 
increase indicates that the stock was priced at a level lower than what the 
market would bear, at least in the short term.  Because underwriters are 
typically compensated by commission (usually around 7 percent) on the 
gross proceeds of the offering at its initial price, the large first day bounce 
appears at first blush to represent money that the underwriter leaves on the 
table.11  However, underpriced IPOs are a ubiquitous phenomenon, and it is 
widely believed that a moderate first day bounce indicates a successful 
transaction.12  This is because a healthy first day bounce purportedly 
generates publicity for the offering, attracts investor interest, and allays the 
possibility of an undersubscribed offering.13  For these reasons, underwriters 
are reported to underprice IPOs intentionally by approximately 10 to 15 
percent of the stock’s expected market value once it is fully distributed.14 
 
Figure 1:  Repeated Counsel Interactions and First Day Bounce 
 
 11. See Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing:  A Legal and Economic Analysis of 
the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 590–
99 (2004). 
 12. See generally Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, 
and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213 (1986); Tim Loughran 
& Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 2004, 
at 5, 5–37; Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 
J. FIN. 1795 (2002). See also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why 
Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 18–22 (1993) (describing 
underpricing and critiquing litigation avoidance theories for it); James C. Spindler, IPO 
Underpricing, Disclosure, and Litigation Risk (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 94, 2009), 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=usclwps-lewps (analyzing 
explanations of underpricing).  For a review of the finance literature discussing underpricing, 
see generally Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO Underpricing, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE:  EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 375–422 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (reviewing 
the literature on underpricing). 
 13. See Griffith, supra note 11, at 599–618 (explaining the potential benefits for 
underwriters and issuers of a significant first day price increase). 
 14. Underwriters frequently attempt to attain a certain level of underpricing intentionally, 
typically around 15 percent of the stock’s expected equilibrium trading price.  The purpose of 
the underpricing is reported to be ensuring strong demand and mitigating the impact of hedge 
funds and other investors “flipping” the stock in the market.  For example, sealed documents 
from the eToys litigation made public in early 2013 feature a Goldman Sachs pitchbook stating 
that an IPO should be priced at a “10-15% discount to the expected fully distributed trading 
level [which is its] anticipated ‘seasoned’ trading value 1-3 months after the offering.” Joe 
Nocera, eToys vs. Goldman Sachs:  The Documents, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/nocera-goldman-sachs-
etoys.html (publishing sealed documents from the case eToys Inc. ex rel. Post Effective Date 
Committee v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 02/601805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002)). 
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Even though a high first day bounce—indicating high levels of 
underpricing—represents a significant loss of money to the underwriter 
because it results in lower commissions, underwriters can garner significant 
value from underpriced offerings through trading commissions and future 
services from preferred clients.15  Therefore, whether the result shown in 
 
 15. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 12, at 1810 (explaining underpricing as a form of 
compensation to investors for past business and inducement for future business:  “[i]f 
underwriters are given discretion in share allocations, the discretion will not automatically be 
used in the best interests of the issuing firm.  Underwriters might intentionally leave more 
money on the table than [sic] necessary, and then allocate these shares to favored buy-side 
clients.  There is some evidence that underpriced share allocations have been used by 
underwriters to enrich buy-side clients in return for quid pro quos . . . to curry favor with the 
executives of other prospective IPO issuers in a practice known as “spinning” . . . or even to 
influence politicians”) (citations omitted); see also Nocera, supra note 14 (disclosing 
documents indicating that the underwriter profited through various kinds of reciprocal investor 
paybacks).  As one commentator has illustrated: 
eToys opened at $78 per share, which meant that Goldman’s clients were sitting on 
a profit of $475 million the minute that the stock started trading on the open market.  
In most cases, the clients cashed out—which was smart, because eToys didn’t stay 
at those levels for long.  But if Goldman got back 40% of those profits in trading 
commissions, then it made $190 million in commissions, compared to that $11.5 
million in fees. 
Felix Salmon, Where Banks Really Make Money on IPOs, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/03/11/where-banks-really-make-money-on-ipos/. 
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Figure 1 represents excessive underpricing or not, it indicates an increasingly 
positive deal outcome for the underwriter. 
This result, as well as others, is further elaborated below.  All 
specifications in the empirical model include controls for each industry, each 
year, and other confounds, and all of the results are significant at the 10 
percent level, with the majority significant at the 5 percent level using 
clustered robust standard errors, with results significant at the 10 percent 
level.  It should be noted that the quantitative and qualitative empirical 
methods used in this Article each have their limits, as will be further 
discussed.  Nonetheless, the results survive numerous tests for robustness as 
well as tests for selection.  Moreover, the results are consistent with existing 
theory, other empirical literature, and practitioner understanding of IPO 
deals, such that they provide very strong support for this Article’s 
conclusions. 
Part I of this Article describes the IPO process, generally, and the roles of 
the relevant parties, in particular the lawyers.  This part also reviews the 
literature relevant to counsels’ role in IPO transactions.  Part II develops 
testable hypotheses about the impact of repeated interactions.  Part III 
describes the data and methodology and statistical results of the hypothesis 
testing.  Part III also explains the assumptions employed in the study and the 
limitations of the methodology.  Lastly, Part III discusses the normative and 
policy implications of the results. 
I.  IPO PRICING AND THE LAWYERS’ ROLE  
IN TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT 
Before delving into the analysis of lawyer-client interactions, it is useful 
to discuss the prevailing theory about how lawyers add value in transactions 
and what specific features of a lawyer’s work in IPOs align with that theory.  
One of the first actions taken by both underwriters and issuing companies 
about to go public is to appoint legal counsel to assist in the process.16  The 
lawyers are essential to the transaction from the very beginning.17  Lawyers 
can influence the outcome of a capital markets transaction in any number of 
ways, but the most obvious mechanisms at work in IPOs are the lawyer’s 
ability to influence the information available to the market via disclosure and 
the lawyer’s ability to reduce transaction costs (including regulatory costs).  
These mechanisms were famously articulated in Professor Ronald Gilson’s 
description of the lawyer as “transaction cost engineer.”18  The “transaction 
 
 16. Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public:  Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 27 
VILL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1981) (discussing the importance of the issuing company’s advisors, 
including its counsel, when beginning an IPO). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 2, at 255 (arguing that lawyers add value in 
transactions by “devising efficient mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset 
pricing theory’s hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of 
effecting transactions in this world”); see also Gilson, Transaction Cost Engineers, supra note 
8, at 508–14; Gilson & Mnookin, Business Lawyers, supra note 8, at 2–4. 
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cost engineer” description starts by accepting the validity of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), which provides a theoretical basis for calculating 
the rate of return on a given asset, given the asset’s risk characteristics.19  The 
“transaction cost engineer” explanation of lawyering posits that lawyers 
contribute to better deals through services that cause financial products or 
transactions to conform to the assumptions underlying the CAPM.20  In the 
context of financial instruments, this means that lawyers help to create 
products whose risk and return profiles are conveyed accurately and 
comprehensibly to participants in the markets, such that the market can 
efficiently value such products.  In the following sections, I describe the tasks 
that lawyers perform in IPOs that fit the “transaction cost engineer” 
description, and I explain how these tasks are the product of collaboration 
with clients as well as other sets of lawyers, as opposed to individual efforts 
by any particular set of counsel. 
A.  Lawyers and Information Production in IPOs 
An IPO is a company’s introduction to the public markets, and therefore 
gathering and disseminating information about the issuing company and its 
prospects is one of the most important components of the transaction.  It 
follows that one means by which lawyers can influence the performance of 
an IPO is through their central role producing information about the issuing 
company. 
1.  The Role of Lawyers and Their Clients in Producing Information 
From the outset of the IPO process, the lawyers for the underwriters and 
the lawyers for the issuing company will play an important role in creating 
the information product that will be used to price and market the issuing 
company’s stock.21  This task will first involve a due diligence review, in 
which the lawyers and the underwriter thoroughly investigate the issuing 
company’s business.22  During the due diligence review, the attorneys will 
gather and verify information for the prospectus, which in turn helps to 
 
 19. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model:  Theory 
and Evidence, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2004, at 25, 25–30 (describing the capital asset 
pricing model and research on its validity).  The model provides a means of estimating the 
non-diversifiable risk of an asset—the risk that cannot be offset by including the asset in a 
diversified portfolio.  The risk corresponds to the return an investor should expect on the asset 
to compensate for that risk. Id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 561–62 n.41 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson 
& Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later:  The 
Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 718 (2003). 
 20. See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 2, at 254. 
 21. See Utset, supra note 3, at 277 (describing the lawyers’ job in an IPO to be the 
production of an information bundle). 
 22. See Royce de Rohan Barondes et al., Underwriters’ Counsel As Gatekeeper or 
Turnstile:  An Empirical Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP. 
MKTS L.J. 164, 167 (2007). 
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manage liability risk from material omissions and misstatements.23  Typical 
legal due diligence often includes a review of material contracts, related party 
transactions, cross default provisions, negative pledge agreements, and rights 
of third parties to terminate contracts.24  Due diligence requires involvement 
of the issuing company, which gathers the relevant information for the 
lawyers to review.  It also necessarily involves the underwriters, who may 
raise questions or ask for verification on particular matters during the 
process.25 
While due diligence progresses, the lawyers for both the issuer and the 
underwriters are heavily involved in drafting the prospectus, which is the 
main document through which the newly issued securities will be 
marketed.26  The prospectus is usually drafted iteratively in meetings 
involving both sets of counsel and their clients and through a series of 
exchanged drafts.27  Counsel for the issuer typically takes the lead in drafting 
the prospectus and thus has a large amount of control over the draft,28 but the 
underwriter’s counsel has significant impact as well.29  The issuing 
company’s management, as well as representatives from the underwriter, 
provides input throughout the process, as each has a direct interest in how the 
document is drafted.30  The underwriter often plays a large role by providing 
precedent documents at the outset of the transaction, thus setting the template 
from which the deal documentation draws.31 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations specify the 
information that must be disclosed32 and also require that the prospectus 
disclosure not be misleading.33  Moreover, the prospectus must not contain 
 
 23. See id.; see also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 4–5. 
 24. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 167 (explaining the details of the lawyers’ 
involvement in the IPO process). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. (“This drafting is an iterative process, as knowledge gained in due diligence 
informs what needs to be said about the issuer.”). 
 28. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14–15 (“The ‘quarterback’ in preparing the 
registration statement is normally the attorney for the company.  Company counsel is 
principally responsible for preparing the non-financial parts of the registration statement.”). 
 29. See id. at 16 (“Close cooperation is required among counsel for the company, the 
underwriters’ counsel, the accountants, and the printer.”). 
 30. See id. at 14, 18. 
 31. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author). 
 32. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–229.915 (2014).  Required disclosure includes:  
(1) information about the company’s business, see §§ 229.101–229.103; (2) the management’s 
discussion and analysis of financial condition of the company, including future projections if 
desired, see § 229.303; (3) financial statements and an auditor’s opinion covering them, see § 
210; (4) a description of material contracts, see §§ 229.10–229.915; (5) information about 
legal and regulatory problems facing the company, see § 229.103; (6) information about the 
officers and directors of the company and their compensation, see §§ 229.403–405; and (7) 
certain industry specific information, see generally SEC, INDUSTRY GUIDES, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/industryguides.pdf. 
 33. See § 230.408. 
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any material misstatements or omissions,34 with “material” defined as 
“matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor 
would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security 
registered.”35  Applying the materiality standard requires legal analysis and 
judgment, and lawyers play a significant role deciding what is necessary to 
disclose.36  Nonetheless, the prospectus is a marketing document as well as 
a regulatory one, and the underwriter typically has requirements of its own 
that make the prospectus a more effective tool for marketing purposes.37  
Additionally, the issuing company usually takes a strong interest in how its 
story is told.38  Thus, the drafting process requires collaboration between all 
the parties and requires counsel to work closely with each other and with both 
sets of clients. 
The due diligence process continues throughout the drafting of the 
prospectus, even after the filing of a preliminary prospectus with the SEC, 
which is required prior to marketing the deal.39  The SEC’s review of the 
preliminary prospectus typically involves several rounds of comments and 
requests for clarifications, additions, or alterations to the disclosure, each of 
which must be addressed.40  During the time that the SEC is reviewing the 
preliminary prospectus, the underwriter and issuer’s management are 
engaged in marketing efforts.41  The lead underwriter and issuer’s 
management market the stock by visiting institutional investors in various 
cities and presenting the company’s story as set out in the preliminary 
prospectus.42  Through this process, known as a “dog and pony show,” the 
underwriter assesses the demand for the stock by building a book of orders 
from interested investors.43  Because the Securities Act prohibits public 
 
 34. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); Exchange Act of 
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 35. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405. 
 36. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168 (reviewing the process by which lawyers 
negotiate and draft the prospectus disclosure and concluding that it is a “process . . . involving 
the exercise of judgment”). 
 37. See id.; Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14. 
 38. Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14, 18. 
 39. Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, Strategic Disclosure and the Pricing of 
Initial Public Offerings 2 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://server1.tepper.cmu.edu/Seminars/docs/hanley_hoberg_March.pdf. 
 40. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 45–50 (discussing the SEC comment and review 
process); see also William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under the 
Securities Act of 1933, 52 BUS. LAW. 65, 70–72 (1996) (describing the SEC staff’s role in the 
registration and disclosure process). 
 41. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 22 (noting that the “red herrings” are distributed 
after filing and while the SEC reviews the filing). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. at 22–23; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 115, 122–25 (11th ed. 2009) (describing the road show and bookbuilding 
process); Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168–69 (describing the development of an offering 
price and using the initial filing range as a proxy for the estimate developed during the “beauty 
contest”). 
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offers or sales of the stock, investor orders cannot be binding.44  Moreover, 
information given to the investors during the road show must conform to 
what is contained in the preliminary prospectus.45 
When the marketing effort is complete, the lead underwriter negotiates 
with the issuing company’s management to set a final price for the stock 
based largely on the investor demand ascertained during the road show.46  
Once the final price is negotiated, a final version of the prospectus and final 
pricing information are deemed effective by the SEC.47  The shares are then 
sold to the investors at the final price, and the company goes public.48 
Throughout this process, the lawyers for both the issuer and the 
underwriter play a key role verifying and synthesizing historical information 
and producing new information that may be needed by offering a legal 
interpretation of key issues in the deal.49  In addition, counsel are often 
responsible for helping to produce accurate information about possible future 
performance by working with the accountants to ensure that earnings 
projections and discussions of planned activities are appropriately balanced 
and match the financial statements in the prospectus.50  Counsel also play a 
key role in determining how the information will be presented, which in turn 
influences how clearly the information is conveyed to investors and 
 
 44. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(e) (2012); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 114 (“Sales 
are . . . still barred . . . and the underwriter also cannot accept customers’ oral offers to buy.  
But the underwriters can ‘build their book,’ collecting non-binding indications of interest from 
customers, which they hope to convert into sales once the registration statement is declared 
effective.”). 
 45. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (prohibiting material misstatements and omissions in 
connection with the sale or offer of securities); 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (civil liability for 
documents containing materially false or misleading information); see also COFFEE & SALE, 
supra note 43, at 123–25 (discussing disclosures to investors during road show presentations). 
 46. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168 (“In a customary IPO, there is not a 
definitive agreement on the price at which the underwriters will resell the stock to the public 
until after the preliminary marketing process is complete, some time after a preliminary 
prospectus has been circulated.  SEC rules, however, require that a preliminary prospectus for 
an IPO circulated prior to the pricing include a bona fide estimate of the price, frequently 
stated as a range, at which the stock will be sold.  This price estimate may change in subsequent 
preliminary prospectuses, as the managing underwriter acquires information during the 
marketing process.”). 
 47. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.424(b), 230.430A (2014); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 
43, at 128–29.  Before the promulgation of Rule 430A, the underwriters were required to file 
pricing information in the form of an amendment to the registration statement before the SEC 
declared the registration statement effective. See id.  Under Rule 430A, the registration 
statement can be declared effective before the filing of pricing-related information as long as 
a complete final prospectus is filed shortly thereafter. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.430A. 
 48. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 129. 
 49. For example, counsel typically give formal legal opinions regarding the issuer and the 
stock being issued, as well as interpret legal matters such as tax and litigation consequences. 
See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18 (“In addition, company counsel normally renders a 
formal opinion on the legality of the securities being registered, which is filed as an exhibit to 
the registration statement.  In connection with a common stock offering, the opinion would 
state that the shares being offered are legally issued, fully paid, and non-assessable.”). 
 50. See id. 
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analysts.51  All of these activities require significant input from clients and 
therefore benefit from good working relationships between counsel and 
clients, as well as a good understanding by counsel of what clients’ interests 
are in each stage of the process.  The ultimate product has an impact on the 
performance of the deal, as discussed in the next section. 
2.  The Role of Information in Transactional Outcomes 
In theory, the information product that lawyers work with their clients to 
produce impacts the extent to which investors can accurately assess the risk 
and return profiles of issuing companies, and therefore should impact the 
performance of a company’s stock, at least in the short- and medium-term.  
The theoretical impact of disclosure on price is supported by empirical work 
that has studied the connection between the two.52 
Empirical studies have generally found a connection between rough 
measures of disclosure quality and the market’s reception of an IPO stock.53  
Disclosure quality has been proxied in these studies in terms of volume,54 
proportion of the prospectus,55 and level of ambiguity.56  These studies 
indicate that certain types of disclosure bear significant relationships to price 
performance of the issued securities in the market.  The studies indicate that 
risk factor disclosure—described as a negative or ambiguous disclosure—
has been found to bear a positive association with underpricing.57  In other 
words, risk factor disclosure is related to a large price increase of the stock 
on the first day of trading, which means that the offering price was lower than 
the market uptake of the stock would have predicted, at least in the short-
term.  By contrast, greater levels of neutral or positive disclosure (i.e., 
everything outside of the risk factors) have been found to correspond to less 
underpricing.58  More particularly, certain sections of the prospectus 
containing important information, specifically the Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A), the Prospectus Summary, and Use of Proceeds 
 
 51. See id. at 18–19. 
 52. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure:  Why Issuer 
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369–93 (1999) (surveying 
available empirical studies on the impact of mandatory disclosure). 
 53. See, e.g., Tom Arnold et al., The Effects of Ambiguous Information on Initial and 
Subsequent IPO Returns, 39 FIN. MGMT. 1497, 1497–1500 (2010) [hereinafter Arnold et al., 
Effects of Ambiguous Information]; Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, The 
Information Content of IPO Prospectuses, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2821, 2821–23 (2010); 
Spindler, supra note 12, at 1–5; Tom Arnold et al., Measuring Risk Disclosure in IPOs and Its 
Effect on Initial and Subsequent Returns (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228419565_Measuring_Risk_Disclosure_in_IPOs_
and_its_Effect_on_Initial_and_Subsequent_Returns. 
 54. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9. 
 55. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–40; see also Spindler, supra note 12, at 
9–10 (using ratio of risk factors to prospectus summary as a proxy for overall proportion of 
positive to negative disclosure). 
 56. Arnold et al., Effects of Ambiguous Information, supra note 53, at 1497. 
 57. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9–19. 
 58. See id. at 16–19. 
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sections, have been found to correspond to lower levels of underpricing.59  
Taken together, these studies indicate that positive information leads to more 
accurate pricing, while ambiguous or negative information leads to less 
accurate pricing and more money left on the table by the issuing company.60  
This also results in lower commissions for the underwriter, but as explained 
below, the underwriter may garner benefits from this phenomenon that more 
than offset any loss.  These studies are relevant to the lawyers’ role in the 
transaction and in the securities law scheme more generally, because both 
sets of lawyers provide substantial input into the disclosure.  The lawyers 
produce information for the prospectus and verify its content through due 
diligence, make legal judgments about the extent of information necessary to 
include in the prospectus, review the prospectus for accuracy, and negotiate 
its content with each other and with the SEC via rounds of comment and 
response.  Ultimately, each set of counsel must sign off on the disclosure 
document.  Therefore, to the extent disclosure has an impact on material 
outcomes of the deal, such as price accuracy and stability over time, the 
lawyers’ role in creating the prospectus is significant. 
B.  Lawyers and Transaction Costs in IPOs 
Transaction cost engineering also involves minimizing transaction costs 
that unnecessarily reduce the value of a financial product, while bearing no 
inherent relationship to the financial product’s expected risk or return.61  
Transaction costs create inefficiencies in the deal making process, causing it 
to become more difficult or costly than it would be if conducted in a 
hypothetical perfect market.62  These costs can arise from numerous sources:  
time, expense, regulatory costs, bargaining costs, enforcement costs, 
inefficient communication, irrational or strategic behavior, and 
externalities.63  Lack of information, risk, and uncertainty also create 
transaction costs, although in a different way than described in the preceding 
section.  With respect to transaction costs, risk, uncertainty, and lack of 
information affect a transaction because they disable complete contracting 
or, as often happens, create obstacles that can cause a deal to break down 
even when it should make economic sense.64 
 
 59. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34.  I have located no study that has 
been able to confirm a causal relationship between disclosure and underpricing, and several 
have noted that it may be the result of underlying uncertainty.  As explained below, this Article 
provides previously unavailable evidence of causation through instrumental variable 
regression. 
 60. See id. at 2857–61. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See, e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 21–28 (1995) 
(describing how transaction costs affect firm size and choices); Oliver E. Williamson, The 
Economics of Organization:  The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553–56 
(1981) (discussing different types of transaction costs and their effects on asset allocation). 
 63. See generally HART, supra note 62; Williamson, supra note 62. 
 64. See generally BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 
1995); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (explaining how transaction costs lead to 
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Lawyers can minimize transaction costs in a number of ways, and good 
working relationships with clients are important to all of them.  Lawyers may 
reduce costly inefficiencies by helping parties avoid and resolve potentially 
costly disputes that could needlessly prevent valuable deal making.65  
Lawyers can contribute to reducing transaction costs by helping coordinate 
the different parties involved and ensuring that all parties have a proper 
understanding of the tasks to be completed at each stage of the deal.66  
Expertise with respect to the IPO process is important for accomplishing this 
end, but relational skill is perhaps more important because it facilitates 
efficient interactions between the parties.67  This can, in turn, reduce 
transaction costs by facilitating faster deal completion and establishing 
processes that require less work on the part of clients, who can then focus 
their energies on other aspects of the deal.  Greater time efficiency can reduce 
unwanted deal delays and allow the underwriter to control the timing of the 
deal to ensure the best performance. 
Familiarity of the underwriter’s counsel with the underwriter—both 
through relationships with the underwriter’s personnel and through 
knowledge of its institutional practices—might also reduce agency costs.  
Although agency costs are a distinct concept from transaction costs, agency 
costs—stemming from the divergence between information and interests of 
the principal and the agent—can lead to inefficiencies that can be categorized 
as a form of transaction cost as well.  The better a lawyer knows his or her 
client’s preferences, the less time and energy are needed for the client to 
transfer information to the agent, and the lower the likelihood that the lawyer 
will erroneously represent the client’s interest.  The more familiar the lawyer 
and the client become, the more trust they develop, and the less effort the 
client has to put forth to monitor the lawyer.  Moreover, the more familiar a 
lawyer is with the underwriters’ ideal outcomes, the more they would be able 
to advocate for the underwriters’ interests, with less delay and lower danger 
of miscommunication.  This may have ripple effects that carry through to the 
execution of the deal. 
 
contract incompleteness, which in turn is a barrier to deal completion); Paul Milgrom & John 
Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57–89 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle 
eds., 1990). 
 65. See Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 2, at 254; Gilson, Transaction Cost Engineers, 
supra note 8, at 509.  Professors Gilson and Mnookin expand upon this model by explaining 
that skilled lawyers help their clients by negotiating value-creating exchanges, capitalizing on 
economies of scale and scope, and managing inherent tensions between value creation and 
distribution. See Gilson & Mnookin, Business Lawyers, supra note 8, at 9–12. 
 66. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 19 (describing the importance of coordination 
between the lawyers and other parties and the importance of having a common understanding 
of the deal structure). 
 67. See id. 
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Finally, a lawyer’s substantive expertise can reduce regulatory costs, a 
subset of transaction costs.68  In this model, lawyers add value by advising 
clients on ways to avoid costly government regulations.  This might take the 
form of avoiding direct costs, such as when a lawyer advises a client on how 
to minimize taxation, or it might involve less direct, but no less significant 
costs, such as when a lawyer advises a client on the most favorable 
jurisdiction and/or form in which to incorporate to reduce legal uncertainty, 
or avoid litigation.69  In the IPO context, counsel may assist in managing 
regulatory costs by advising on the issuer’s legal organization and capital 
structure prior to the commencement of the deal.70  Counsel also liaise with 
the SEC and other regulators, and the lawyers’ ability to handle issues that 
the regulators bring up can have an impact on the timing and efficiency of 
the deal.71 
C.  Lawyers As Reputational Intermediaries 
Another possible source of value of transactional lawyers is the role of 
lawyers as reputational intermediaries.72  Reputational intermediaries convey 
important information to the market about the quality of a transaction.73  This 
model suggests that lawyers (as well as other professionals involved in the 
deal) add value by providing a signal of quality in the underlying 
transaction.74  This model is not exclusive of the “transaction costs 
engineers” model; in fact, a lawyer’s reputation may itself derive from the 
ability to reduce transaction costs in the way that Gilson and others describe.  
 
 68. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 500–02 (2006) (reporting the results of a survey in in-house legal counsel 
on the value of transactional lawyers). 
 69. See id.; see also Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law (Harvard Law 
Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econs. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper 337, 2002), 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1165&context=harvard_olin (describing the 
market for corporate law, as evidenced by choices of jurisdiction of incorporation that most 
reduces costs related to legal uncertainty and use of familiar default rules). 
 70. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18–19. 
 71. See id. at 19–20 (discussing the process of dealing with SEC comment and deficiency 
letters). 
 72. See Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century:  
Adding Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 17, 46–48 (2003); see also Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 
74 OR. L. REV. 15, 44–45 (1995) (proposing alternatives to lawyers as reputational 
intermediaries).  The impact of lawyer expertise has been examined in the mergers and 
acquisitions context. See C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 189–99 (2013). 
 73. See generally Randolph P. Beatty, Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial Public 
Offerings, 64 ACCT. REV. 693 (1989); Beatty & Ritter, supra note 12; Richard Carter & Steven 
Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1053 (1990); 
Richard B. Carter et al., Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run 
Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285, 285–290 (1998). 
 74. See Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial 
Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545, 596 (1996); see also Okamato, supra note 72, at 18 
(“The suggestion here is that service as a reputational intermediary is a defining aspect of 
lawyers’ work.”). 
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Nonetheless, the reputational intermediary model encompasses more than the 
lawyer’s substantive ability to do a deal.  The model includes the possibility 
that because of reputational concerns, lawyers will screen transactions before 
agreeing to take on the work, and therefore the mere fact of a lawyer’s 
participation in a deal is a signal of quality.75 
In the context of IPOs specifically, theories have been advanced that the 
reputation of the underwriter,76 auditor,77 and underwriter’s counsel78 might 
all convey information to investors beyond what is contained in the 
prospectus and affect the price of the IPO stock.  Empirical tests of these 
theories have demonstrated a relationship between lead underwriter 
reputation and lower levels of underpricing, indicating more accurate pricing 
of the offering.79  This has been explained as a function of the incentives of 
high reputation underwriters in preserving their reputations through more 
accurate pricing.  A similar relationship has been demonstrated with regard 
to auditors.80  However, studies of lawyers’ reputations have had mixed 
results:  one study found a negative relationship between market share of 
legal counsel and IPO underpricing.81  Other studies have found that lawyers’ 
reputations, when measured by market share, do not impact price.82  This 
makes sense to the extent that the identity of the lawyers rarely plays a role 
in investors’ decision making.83  However, as explained further in subsequent 
sections, the reputation of legal counsel alone is unlikely to play a large role 
in the performance of deals, as indicated by the quantitative and qualitative 
results discussed below. 
D.  Repeated Interaction and Selection of Counsel 
Apart from lawyer reputation, lawyers’ ability to add value in the ways 
just described might all be affected by their familiarity with the clients whom 
they represent.  Even reputation, though not directly impacted by familiarity 
with clients, might be related to lawyers’ ability to cultivate and maintain 
client relationships.  One way to assess whether good working relationships 
have any impact on deals is to look at the repeated interactions between 
lawyers and clients.  Repeated interactions provide a useful proxy for better 
 
 75. See id. 
 76. See e.g., Beatty & Ritter, supra note 12, at 213; Carter et al., supra note 73, at 285. 
 77. See, e.g., Beatty, supra note 73, at 693. 
 78. See, e.g., Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 166. 
 79. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2853–55. But see Patch Paczkowski & Majdi 
Anwar Quttainah, Law Firm Prestige As a Signal of Value for Initial Public Offerings (June 
19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2087695.  For further 
discussion of this theory, see generally Franklin Allen & Gerald R. Faulhaber, Signaling by 
Underpricing in the IPO Market, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 303 (1989). 
 80. See generally Beatty, supra note 73. 
 81. See Royce de R. Barondes & Gary C. Sanger, Lawyer Experience and IPO Pricing 
16–21 (May 4, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=227729. 
 82. See Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 575–95. 
 83. Telephone Interview with Attorney (June 21, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author). 
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lawyer-client relationships because they build familiarity and trust, establish 
common understanding, and facilitate communication.84 
As previously noted, my research has not revealed other studies of the 
impact of lawyers’ relational skill in the transactional setting.  However, 
empirical studies of lawyer relationships in other contexts shed some light on 
what results might be expected, and a number of instructive studies have 
looked at lawyers as repeat players.  One noteworthy study demonstrated that 
iterative relations significantly promote collaboration between lawyers on 
opposite sides of a case in the litigation context.85  Another empirical study 
tested repeated interactions among litigators and concluded that frequent 
contact helps lawyers to learn about each other’s strategies, build 
relationships, and foster concern for reputation.86  The study concluded that 
repeated interactions increase cooperation between lawyers negotiating a 
settlement, as the different sides learn how best to deal with each other.87  It 
is possible that the dynamics at work for repeated meetings among litigators 
would hold true for repeated meetings between lawyers and clients in the 
transactional setting as well. 
The empirical literature on teams adds support to the hypothesis that 
repeated interaction fosters trust and better teamwork.  A number of studies 
provide evidence that frequent interaction leads to the creation of group 
norms, shared understanding of the tasks to be completed, and routinized 
processes.88  These processes further allow each member of the team to 
leverage individual expertise more effectively and in concert with other team 
members.  Experimental evidence suggests that when team members are 
replaced by newer members of a team, some of these gains are lost as the 
team and the new member adjust to a new group dynamic.89  This further 
suggests that frequent collaboration engenders benefits to a group endeavor 
that cannot be easily replicated by other means. 
 
 84. See Steve W. J. Kozlowski & Daniel R. Ilgen, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Work 
Groups and Teams, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 77, 81 (2006). 
 85. See Gilson & Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents, supra note 9, at 534–64 
(discussing the impact of iterative interactions on litigators); see also Croson & Mnookin, 
supra note 9, at 340–45. 
 86. Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation?  
Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 46, 59–60 (2002). 
 87. See id. at 40–48 (outlining mechanisms by which better results are obtained through 
repeated interactions); see also Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 331–50 (stating game-
theoretic bases for increased cooperation over time). 
 88. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 81 (“[R]epeated interactions among 
individuals that constitute processes tend to regularize, such that shared 
structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent process interactions.  Process 
begets structure, which in turn guides process.”); see also, Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 
17–19 (discussing the need for deal team members to have a common understanding of the 
tasks to be accomplished). 
 89. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 86.  In one interesting experiment, teams 
were assembled to create origami birds.  Teams gained efficiency from repeating the task 
together multiple times, but lost efficiency when members of the existing team were replaced 
with new members. See id. 
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Empirical studies of the relationships between lawyers and their clients 
suggest that clients value familiarity.90  Large corporate clients such as 
investment banks frequently choose from among a panel of lawyers, all of 
whom are of high quality.91  But recent empirical work indicates that 
selection of counsel is based on more than quality of counsel and fee structure 
as traditionally assumed; relationships with lawyers and teams of lawyers 
within each firm exert a strong influence on which law firms are selected to 
act for a client.92  Similarly, lawyers in the equity capital markets space 
emphasize the importance of interpersonal relationships with clients as a 
major factor that helps them to get repeat business.93  Thus, there are 
indications that familiarity and relationships are valuable to clients as well as 
lawyers. 
Nonetheless, familiarity and repeated interaction might not necessarily 
lead to measurably better outcomes.  First, even if there are intangible 
benefits from familiarity, they may not translate into any quantifiable results 
in terms of deal performance.  The various individuals who are party to the 
deal might enjoy the experience more, and feel it is more efficient, but this 
may or may not translate into, for example, better disclosure, or better 
marketing.  Second, familiarity does not necessarily lead to better quality of 
interaction in every instance.  Some research suggests that working together 
repeatedly may not lead to better collaboration if team processes are not well 
thought out.94  Moreover, it is not difficult to imagine that familiarity might 
make counsel less able to be objective, either for fear of offending the client 
or from loss of perspective after spending too much time taking the client’s 
point of view.  Alternatively, familiarity might cause lawyers to take the 
relationship for granted and therefore devote fewer resources to the client.  In 
the same vein, interpersonal considerations or overreliance might make it 
difficult for a client to fire its counsel, thus allowing counsel to shirk.  I turn 
now to a discussion of the data to explain which way it cuts. 
 
 90. See Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1003. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. But see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human 
Capitalists:  An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split 
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 357–68 (1985) (advancing a model of lawyer selection based 
on relationship to a firm and firm-specific capital rather than interpersonal relationships 
among individuals). 
 93. Some banks have preferred firms.  For example, Morgan Stanley is known to work 
with Davis Polk & Wardell regularly on equity capital markets deals.  Similarly, Goldman 
Sachs is known to work frequently with Sullivan & Cromwell.  Several of the lawyers in these 
firms have such close relationships with bank personnel that they participate in business 
related decisions, and their capital markets partners become involved in the marketing side of 
IPOs. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author). 
 94. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 249–50. 
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II.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A.  Repeated Interactions and IPO Deal Outcomes 
In this section, I describe the data and empirical analysis that support the 
implications of the theoretical discussion above.  First, I describe the 
impressions of team dynamics taken from interviews with practicing lawyers.  
I then explain the quantitative analysis, drawing from an original dataset of 
IPOs and examining the repeated interactions between banks and law firms 
that handle the transactions. 
1.  Practitioner Experience and Team Dynamics 
Practitioner accounts are useful for understanding how lawyers and their 
clients perceive the impact of team dynamics on deals outcomes.  The 
lawyers interviewed for this study routinely listed familiarity and trust as key 
hallmarks of IPO deals that they experience as successful.  Often they cite 
past experience working with their clients as an important precursor for 
familiarity and trust.95  Moreover, better deals result when all the parties 
working on the deal seem to have a common vision of how the deal should 
be done.96  While there are certain similarities between deals, each 
underwriter leading a deal has idiosyncratic institutional priorities, and the 
people within the underwriting banks have their own preferences.97  Lawyers 
frequently report that understanding those preferences from the outset of the 
deal helps to facilitate the entire process.98  The lawyers on the deal come to 
understand their client organizations’ operations,99 including the key 
personnel to contact to accomplish the range of tasks necessary to move the 
deal along.100  In addition, lawyers develop an understanding of the 
communication norms inside an investment bank,101 as well as the 
institutional preferences with regard to how to negotiate the deal.102  This 
understanding of how the client operates supplements an enhanced 
understanding of the client’s institutional interests, as well as the preferences 
 
 95. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 24, 2013) (name withheld by request) 
(on file with author). 
 96. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31. 
 97. See id. 
 98. There was a consensus among lawyer interviews that this was the case. See, e.g., 
Telephone Interview with Attorney (Oct. 20, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on file with 
author). 
 99. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Oct. 20, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author).  As one lawyer in a large capital markets practice described, “[i]t gets easier 
the more times you work together.  I know exactly who to e-mail or call if I need something.  
Or who to prod if something needs to get done.” Id. 
 102. Telephone Interview with Attorney 2 (July 24, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author). 
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of individuals in the client organization.103  The result, in theory, is better 
coordination of agents with their principals in the performance of their tasks.  
In addition, information disparities are less a source of agency costs because 
the lawyer-agent has less need to spend time gathering information about the 
client’s interests and can negotiate more forcefully on the client’s behalf. 
Futher, when lawyers and clients work together frequently, they develop 
greater mutual trust, assuming previous deals have gone well.  Trust allows 
clients to feel less need to monitor their lawyer-agents, freeing the client to 
focus on marketing and other commercial aspects of the deal.104  Indeed, 
some lawyer-client relationships involve such a high degree of trust and 
familiarity that lawyers become involved in helping their clients to think 
through business strategy in addition to providing legal advice.105  The 
overall impression is that frequent collaboration leads to trust, that each 
member of the deal team can focus on his or her job better, and that the team 
produces better work, more quickly. 
If familiarity creates trust and efficiency, lack of familiarity can create the 
opposite.  When describing deals that did not go well, lawyers recall working 
with other counsel who do not seem to know the norms of how deals should 
be done.106  These deals typically involve issuer’s counsel that either lack 
experience in IPOs, or resolutely refuse to trust underwriters.  In such 
situations, there is often a lack of trust and an adversarial attitude toward the 
underwriter and its counsel.  In such cases, lawyers for issuing companies 
reportedly fight over issues that most seasoned participants in IPO deals 
would think are unimportant, and when the issuing company’s management 
makes unreasonable demands, the issuer’s lawyers refuse to counsel their 
clients on commonly accepted industry practices.107 
On the client side, personnel in investment banks who work with lawyers 
describe poor deals as those in which the lawyers do not seem to know what 
they are doing and in which the bankers have to explain every step.  The deals 
are marked by a lack of trust in the bank’s counsel and the need to recheck 
and sometimes redo work that the lawyers have done.108 
 
 103. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31.  For example, one 
in-house lawyer taking his company public recounts that during negotiations, the 
underwriter’s counsel, who worked frequently with the underwriters on such deals, regularly 
expressed confidence about what his client would or would not agree to, without any need to 
confer with anyone from the bank’s team. See Interview with Attorney (June 19, 2013) (name 
withheld by request) (on file with author). 
 104. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013), supra note 99 (recounting that 
some partners in some law firms understand their industry so well that they actually are able 
to advise on the help with the commercial side of the a capital markets deal). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31. 
 107. See id.  Experienced attorneys are reportedly better able to counsel issuing company 
management against making exaggerated statements or falling out of step with standard 
practices. See also, Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14. 
 108. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2014), supra note 99. 
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2.  Quantitative Analysis 
The basis for the quantitative analysis below is the observation that 
lawyers working on IPOs frequently represent the same underwriter and the 
same teams within an underwriting bank.  Moreover, lawyers representing 
underwriters will often meet the same sets of counsel representing issuers 
from deal to deal.109  While it is difficult to observe interpersonal interactions 
with enough regularity to assess their systematic impacts, a meaningful proxy 
of these interactions is the frequency with which an investment bank 
managing a deal and the lawyers serving as the bank’s counsel work 
together.110  Although I do not observe the individuals inside the investment 
banks themselves, it is reasonable to infer that many of the same individuals 
would be involved in deals done within a short time frame if the deals are 
done out of the same office, in the same location, and within a particular 
industry.  Accounting for those factors, the membership of the teams within 
banks and firms reportedly remains stable over relatively short periods of 
time.111 
I examine repeated interactions by looking at the number of IPO deals 
completed in the preceding one year, two years, and three years involving:  
(1) the same underwriter’s counsel and lead underwriter(s) and (2) the same 
sets of counsel.  In theory, if repeated interaction improves relationships 
between a lawyer and his or her client, it might have positive benefits for a 
lawyer’s effectiveness, coordination, and communication in furtherance of 
the client’s interests.  In addition, relationships across the table can help to 
facilitate the deal.  With respect to uncertainty and risk, better coordination 
could help produce more complete and easily digested disclosure, thus 
reducing uncertainty in the market and allowing investors to confidently 
calculate risk.  Coordination might help in this regard because both sets of 
lawyers and the underwriter would have a shared understanding of the type 
of information to unearth in the due diligence process and how best to present 
it in the prospectus to tell the appropriate story to the market.112  This would 
in turn translate into more accurate pricing and better performance in the 
 
 109. Between 1996 and 2010, the same law firm and lead underwriter(s) worked across the 
table from one another multiple times in the same year on 450 occasions, out of 2265 total 
deals.  Between 1996 and 2010, there were also 406 instances in which issuer’s counsel had 
acted as underwriter’s counsel for the same underwriter within the previous year.  On 206 of 
those occasions, the issuer’s counsel also had worked across the table from the lead 
underwriter more than one time in the past year, out of a total of 2265 deals.  Between those 
same years, 454 IPO deals featured law firms that had worked across the table from one 
another in an IPO deal at least three times within the preceding two years. 
 110. As an additional robustness check, names of individual attorneys for each deal were 
collected and matched to each transaction.  The result shows a significant effect, with a 
stronger magnitude.  These results, as well as others, will be reported in a future study. 
 111. This was corroborated by interviews. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Attorney 
(Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31. 
 112. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18–19 (discussing the importance of close 
coordination among members of the deal team). 
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market.  Stronger market performance, coupled with better disclosure, should 
produce less IPO-related litigation, all else being equal. 
B.  Analysis of the Data 
The following discussion explains the quantitative analysis and result of 
this study in detail.  The data analyzed below comes from a number of public 
sources.  The starting point for data collection on IPOs in the United States 
is the Kenney-Patton IPO Database.113  This dataset contains information for 
2287 de novo IPOs between 1996 and 2010.114  Each IPO was cross-checked 
with the Thompson ONE deal record to confirm the date, ticker, and issuer 
name.115  From the Thompson ONE database I also pull information on the 
underwriting syndicate, including the names of the bookrunners or joint 
bookrunners, managers’ and issuer’s counsel, and the age of the issuing 
company.  The dealsheet also includes the initial price range filed with the 
SEC as well as the stock opening price, which I use to determine whether the 
opening price was revised up or down from the initial range.  To find 
measures of each stock’s performance over time, I use information from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.116  In particular, I 
look at the opening day closing price relative to the offering price; the price 
change at thirty, sixty, and ninety days and one year; and the volatility over 
thirty, sixty, and ninety days.  In addition, from the SEC’s EDGAR database, 
I gather the offering prospectuses from each IPO and cull from these the total 
word counts, as well as the word counts for each section of the prospectus 
including the prospectus summary, the risk factors, and the management’s 
discussion and analysis section.117  The word counts disregard information 
contained in tables and charts.  This methodology is used in other research 
on IPOs on the rationale that pure word counts, while constituting a very 
rough estimate of the types of disclosure included, do not suffer from the 
potential bias associated with hand-coded disclosure elements.118  
 
 113. For more information on the database, see Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Guide to 
the Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
from 1990 Through 2010, U.C. Davis (2013), 
http://hcd.ucdavis.edu/faculty/webpages/kenney/misc/Firm_IPO_Database_Guide.pdf. 
 114. The database excludes offerings of capital trusts, securitizations, IPOs of preferred 
stock, and spin-offs. 
 115. THOMPSON ONE DATABASE, http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/tools-
applications/trading-investment-tools/thomson-one-investment-research-
tools.html?gclid=CjwKEAiAx4anBRDz6JLYjMDxoQYSJAA4loRmqel_bXT8gpjPqFxMyt
6A9VmdVOXXoM_u9oMbvA_3EhoCJdvw_wcB (last visited Aug. 20, 2015). 
 116. CRSP U.S. STOCK DATABASES, http://www.crsp.com/products/research-
products/crsp-us-stock-databases (last visited Jan. 21, 2015). 
 117. U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Aug. 
20, 2015). 
 118. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9 (noting the this method “has the advantage of being 
objective, as it does not rely upon subjective evaluations of particular disclosures (such as 
coding a line of disclosure as ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and does not require subjective index 
weighting”).  Word counts for my study were taken for a total of 2258 prospectuses.  A small 
number (seven) of prospectuses were excluded due to transcription errors in the database. 
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Information on class action litigation was taken from the Stanford Securities 
Class Action Clearinghouse.119 
Twenty-two records were dropped because information could not be found 
on the issue in the Thompson ONE database or because the CRSP database 
did not contain information on the share price.  The resulting dataset has 2265 
IPOs spanning fifteen years.  The identities of each IPO’s managing 
underwriter or underwriters are taken from this data set.  A bank is considered 
a managing underwriter if it is either the sole bookrunner or a joint 
bookrunner.120   The identities of the underwriter’s counsel and issuer’s 
counsel are similarly determined from this data.121 
The offer date is used to construct variables of how often a certain 
underwriter-counsel and counsel-counsel pair have worked together in the 
previous one year, two years, and three years for each new issue.  For 
example, Goldman Sachs was a manager of Goodman Global’s IPO on April 
5, 2006, and their counsel was Cahill Gordon & Reindel.  This was the third 
time the pair had worked together in a year, as they had also worked together 
on Horizon Lines Inc.’s September 26, 2005 IPO and New Skies Satellites 
May 9, 2005 IPO.  Prior to that, they had not worked together since they 
teamed up for Equinix, Inc.’s August 10, 2000 IPO.  Time periods beyond 
three years are not examined given the likelihood of lower rates of overlap 
between teams working together on transactions after such long time periods. 
With respect to the recurring deal in which the same counsel represents an 
underwriter, or in which the same law firms meet on opposite sides of the 
deal, I analyze a number of quantifiable deal outcomes:  price performance, 
the incidence of price correction before offering date, the incidence of 
litigation, the length of time to complete a transaction, and the occurrence of 
non-integer pricing (as a signal of a more heavily negotiated price).  These 
performance measures are readily quantifiable and offer strong indications 
of how well the parties to the deal have performed once other relevant factors 
are controlled for. 
With respect to price performance, for purposes of investigating the extent 
to which frequency of interaction matters, I employ Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression analysis122 using the stock price increase during the first 
 
 119. STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2015). 
 120. The most frequent lead underwriters are Goldman Sachs (217), Merrill Lynch (154), 
Morgan Stanley (137), Lehman Brothers (131), and JP Morgan (122).  Bank mergers are 
treated as the “death” of each of the merging banks and the “birth” of the merged bank.  To 
give an illustrative example, “Credit Suisse,” “First Boston,” and “Credit Suisse First Boston” 
are treated as three different firms. 
 121. The most frequent managers’ counsel are Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati (176), 
Latham & Watkins (160), Davis Polk & Wardwell (151), Cravath, Swaine & Moore (111), 
and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (106).  As with investment banks, law firm 
mergers are treated as the death of each old firm and the birth of a new firm.  In the rare cases 
of multiple firms representing management, the two firms are treated as a single unit for that 
transaction. 
 122. OLS is a statistical method that attempts to find a function that approximately fits a 
set of data; i.e., it attempts to determine the relationship between a set of explanatory variables 
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day of trading (Appendix Table 1) and the price change after thirty, sixty, 
and ninety days of trading, relative to the performance of the S&P Index to 
account for the effect of market movements (Appendix Table 2).  With 
respect to the probability of price correction (Appendix Table 3) as well as 
class action litigation (Appendix Table 4), I employ a probit regression 
analysis.123  For upward price revision, I estimate the change in probability 
that the parties to the deal will correctly raise the offering price from the top 
of the initial filing range for deals that perform well in the market.  With 
respect to litigation, I estimate the change in probability that a securities class 
action lawsuit will be filed in the first six months and the first year after the 
IPO offer date. 
In addition to these variables, I use a number of other independent 
variables to ensure a generalizable result, in line with prior empirical 
literature on IPOs.124  These variables include:  (1) dummy variables for the 
IPO year, (2) the industry category of the issuer (as determined according to 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code) to control for different market 
conditions over time and in various industries, (3) each investment bank in 
order to allow for variation in outcome variables associated with each lead 
underwriter, as well as (4) the interaction of these variables.125  In addition, 
for all specifications, I control for the IPO size measured in terms of the gross 
proceeds of the offering, a variable frequently used as a proxy for deal 
quality.126 
I perform each analysis using a number of alternative specifications to test 
the robustness of the model.  Appendix Tables 7 and 8 report the results for 
 
and an outcome variable of interest. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 53 (MIT Press 2010). 
 123. A probit model is a statistical model in which the outcome variable can take on only 
one of two values; it is useful for estimating the probability of an event occurring, versus the 
probability of the event not occurring. See id. at 566–67. 
 124. See e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33; see also Eckbo et al., supra 
note 7, at 276–79. 
 125. Dummy variables provide a method of controlling for variation within certain 
categories of variables by removing the mean of the observations for the dependent variable 
of interest.  For example, in an OLS regression using first day price jump (i.e., underpricing) 
as the dependent variable, fixed effects for (inter alia) each year are used.  This allows for 
variation in overall underpricing from year to year, by removing the mean underpricing for 
each year and controlling for the variation in underpricing that is specific to that particular 
year.  So if, for example, 1999 was a year that saw a particularly large amount of underpricing, 
the fixed effect would remove the year-specific average underpricing and leave only the 
variation attributable to other factors.  The same is done for each IPO quarter, each lead 
underwriter, each industry, and the interaction of each industry and year. See WOOLDRIDGE, 
supra note 122, at 307–10. 
 126. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33; Eckbo et al., supra note 7, at 276–
79.  Regressions use the natural log of gross proceeds to mitigate skewness in the distribution 
of dollar amounts. See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33.  In the alternative 
specifications in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, I also use the size of the company (measured by 
total assets) and the book value per share as alternatives ways to control for deal quality.  
Regressions using total assets yield coefficients similar to those using the log of gross 
proceeds, indicating that the latter is a good proxy for the size of the issuing company. 
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analysis of the first day price increase and the probability of litigation under 
the alternative specifications. 
C.  Main Results 
This section illustrated some of the basic relationships in the raw data.  The 
figures below show that repeated bank-lawyer interactions in the past year 
are associated with a greater opening day price jump, as well as greater price 
performance after the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days (relative to 
the S&P 500 Index). 
 
Figure 2:  Repeated Interactions and Price Performance 
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 These graphs show that issues where the lead underwriting bank and 
counsel have worked together repeatedly tend to exhibit superior price 
performance (as well as underpricing) at incrementally higher levels.  Of 
course, this is merely descriptive, and there are many confounds that also 
affect these performance measures.  To attempt to investigate if this 
relationship is real, I turn to OLS regression analysis controlling for factors 
that influence market performance. 
1.  Price Performance Regression Analysis 
The first performance measure analyzed is the opening day price jump.  
Panel A of Appendix Table 1 shows the results, demonstrating a strong and 
significant effect from increased bank-counsel interactions, even after 
controlling very flexibly for year, industry, and bank fixed effects. 
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The first two specifications look at the number of bank-counsel 
interactions within a year of the IPO, with and without bank fixed effects.  
The subsequent columns look at the number of interactions in the preceding 
two and three year periods.  In all cases, the marginal effect of an additional 
interaction is positive and statistically significant.  There are two notable 
trends across these specifications:  the value of a marginal interaction 
decreases as the time horizon increases, and the effect survives the 
introduction of bank fixed effects to control for quality concerns or bank 
idiosyncrasies. 
The next set of performance measures to be examined is the percentage 
price change over the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days, relative to 
the percentage change in the S&P Index over the same set of days to control 
for the effect of overall market returns.  The controls in all cases are dummies 
for the IPO year, the SIC category, and the interaction of those two sets.127  
Robust standard errors are used for each regression.128 
Panel A of Appendix Table 2 shows the results for the thirty, sixty, and 
ninety-day price performance measures.  Deals involving frequent 
collaborators are associated with strong market performance over the first 
ninety days, as measured by price relative to the S&P 500 Index.  The effect 
of each additional interaction on the relative change in a stock’s price relative 
to the S&P Index after thirty trading days is 4.4 percent when the lawyer-
underwriter collaborations occur within the past year.  The marginal 
performance price increase drops to 2.8 percent when the lawyer-bank 
collaborations are spread over the past three years.  Correspondingly, fewer 
recent interactions between a bank and a law firm are strongly associated 
with lower price performance over the same periods.  The effect remains for 
the first ninety days of trading, for which each deal in the past year is 
associated with a 7.5 percent increase, declining to a 4.1 percent increase in 
relative price for deals within the preceding three years. 
From the regression analysis, it appears that frequency of interaction bears 
a strong positive correlation with stock performance.  This is consistent with 
the hypothesis that teams of lawyers and bankers working together repeatedly 
and over a short period of time are able to improve deal outcomes, leading to 
a positive impact on the price of a stock.  However, these outcomes may also 
indicate overly high levels of underpricing, especially because the price 
increase is sustained over the long term.  In addition, selection is a particular 
concern with respect to the underwriter and its counsel because managing 
underwriters might be likely to pick the same law firms repeatedly to do the 
best performing deals.  In order to rule out selection and tease apart positive 
relational impacts from negative ones, I perform further tests below. 
 
 127. Additional controls such as the syndicate size were not significant and so were not 
reported. 
 128. To eliminate the possibility of clustering with respect to industry, bank, and year, each 
regression was run using cluster robust standard errors on those dimensions with no change in 
the significance of the results. See A. Colin Cameron et al., Robust Inference with Multiway 
Clustering, 29 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 238, 238–49 (2011). 
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2.  Selection 
A concern with respect to interactions between the underwriters and their 
counsel is the possibility that the results above are selection driven.  After all, 
underwriters select their counsel, and we might be concerned that their 
selection criteria are related somehow to the outcomes analyzed above.  If 
that is the case, then the underwriter’s selection of counsel could be tied to 
the quality of the issuer and the quality of the transaction as a whole, and 
metrics such as price performance might simply be a result of the same 
underlying considerations that led to the appointment of a particular law firm.  
Therefore, the quality of the deal drives both the result and the selection of 
counsel.  For instance, if Goldman Sachs wins the lead underwriting spot in 
a “hot” IPO, it may select its most preferred counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell, 
to act as counsel on the deal, and because the deal is “hot,” it may generate 
better market performance and/or more underpricing. 
The most compelling argument against this possible selection story is that 
the underwriter selects its counsel before due diligence takes place and before 
the bookbuilding process begins, meaning that the worrisome early selection 
takes place well before the bank is in a position to know how a particular 
issue will perform in the market.  One might nonetheless observe that an 
underwriter can have a good sense of what sort of price performance an issue 
will yield in advance of the bookbuilding itself—after all, the underwriter has 
to come up with a proposed price range when making its pitch to the issuer 
in the first place. 
Even taking this fact into account, however, the incremental nature of the 
results (i.e., that each additional interaction is associated with an incremental 
increase in price performance on average) makes the selection story above 
unlikely.  That is the case because in order for selection to be driving the 
results, it would have to be true that lead underwriters can accurately and 
systematically predict the level of underpricing and market price 
performance (as well as time to completion and litigation outcomes as further 
discussed below) and choose different legal counsel a specific number of 
times based on the precise predictions for each deal.  That scenario is 
extremely unlikely.129 
Nonetheless, further analysis of the data is useful to provide evidence that 
selection is unlikely to be driving the observed effects.  I do this by cutting 
the data to isolate observations that might plausibly be the product of 
selection.  As previously described, the most obvious selection story is that 
investment banks managing high performing IPOs are more likely to choose 
particular counsel repeatedly.  If this were the case, it would also produce a 
pattern in which repeated bank-counsel interactions are associated with 
incrementally better market performance, as seen above.  To determine 
whether this selection story is supported by the data, I observe that a 
 
 129. See, e.g., Telephone interview with Attorney (June 21, 2013) (name withheld by 
request) (on file with author). 
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relatively small group of investment banks typically leads the “hot” IPOs.  
The banks that tend to get these deals are the ones that have the greatest 
amount of IPO experience.130  I continue by limiting the sample to those 
banks, creating smaller subgroups consisting of those banks that serve as lead 
underwriter in at least forty issues in the dataset (the top eighteen banks) and 
to those that manage at least eighty issues in the dataset (the top seven 
banks).131  If the main results are selection driven, they should disappear in 
the limited samples, because those samples contain most of the “hot” IPOs, 
and any significant variation due to the quality of the underwriter or the 
quality of the deal should flatten out.  But as Appendix Table 9 shows, the 
results remain even in these limited samples.  I conduct the same analysis 
using dollar market share in the year preceding any given deal as a measure 
of bank quality, instead of the number of deals in the dataset, and the results 
remain.  To further rule out the possible impact of selection, I perform the 
same regressions after removing all deals in which the bank employs its 
“favorite” law firms.  I determine a bank’s “favorite” law firms in two 
different ways.  First, I remove the deals involving law firms with which 
banks have done the greatest number of deals within the preceding one, two, 
and three years.  Second, I remove deals involving lawyer-underwriter pairs 
that are reported in interviews to be favored lawyer-client relationships in 
equity capital markets.  If selection is driving the main results, and banks are 
simply picking their favored law firms for the best deals, then the results 
should disappear when the deals involving favored law firms are removed.  
However, the results remain.  Finally, I create a variable for the experience 
level of each law firm to see if selection based on expertise might be driving 
the results.  The results remain when controlling for IPO experience of each 
firm.  Moreover, when the number of deals a firm has done in the past over 
the last one, two, and three years is used as the dependent variable in 
regressions, instead of the interactions between firms and investment banks, 
the effect does disappear.  This further indicates that the interaction between 
lawyers and their clients impacts the deal beyond the lawyers’ experience 
alone.  These results, along with other robustness checks, are reported in 
Appendix Tables 7 and 8. 
 
 130. See id.  In addition, prior to entering academia, I spent several years as an associate in 
the capital markets department of a major international law firm, where I worked on IPOs as 
well as other types of transactions. 
 131. I note that the proxy used here for quality is different than that used in some other 
studies. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34 (using dollar market share for the 
previous year as a measure of underwriter quality).  However, for present purposes, the 
number of deals works as well or better than other measures because it more directly relates 
to the potential selection problem inherent in repeated interactions with counsel.  Nonetheless, 
as a test for robustness, I tested the more commonly employed measure of quality (dollar 
market share for the preceding year).  The results remained. 
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3.  Performance Versus Excessive Underpricing 
Another issue which complicates the interpretation of the data is that first 
day price performance, or underpricing, has both good and bad 
interpretations for deal quality.  A very large opening day bounce can be 
viewed not as an indicator of better stock performance, but rather as evidence 
of pricing error on the part of underwriter and poor service provided to the 
issuing company.132  However, as previously discussed, an IPO can be 
considered a success for an underwriter even where underpricing is high, 
because underwriters are able to capture value through trading commissions 
on the IPO stock (the trading of which tends to increase the more underpriced 
the stock is), as well as quid pro quo business from favored investors who 
receive allocations of the underpriced stock and profit from the rise in its 
price.133  In order to better understand how to interpret first day price increase 
and the effect of repeated interactions, it is necessary to parse the 
underpricing puzzle more finely. 
Understanding the implications of underpricing for the relationship 
between the underwriter and its counsel requires a brief detour into the vast 
economic literature on underpricing.  Numerous theoretical explanations for 
underpricing have been advanced, and a few that are especially relevant to 
the analysis here are worth noting.134  One such explanation is that the 
underpricing serves as a compensation mechanism for investment banks’ 
favored institutional clients, who often bear risk by agreeing to purchase 
shares in IPO issuers.135  The banks need these investors to ensure adequate 
demand for stock in certain offerings, including offerings in which the risk 
of return is uncertain.  Banks compensate these clients for agreeing to 
purchase such stock (and thus ensure adequate demand for the offering) by 
giving an essentially guaranteed margin of return through the underpricing.  
Another possible explanation is that underpricing is a form of insurance 
against the risk of liability, as a stock that performs well relative to its 
offering price is much less frequently the subject of litigation than those 
which perform poorly.136  Regardless of the explanation, the phenomenon is 
 
 132. See generally Alexander, supra note 12 (discussing a theory of underpricing as an 
artifact of error, combined with abundance of caution). 
 133. See Griffith, supra note 11, at 591–92. 
 134. Most of the theoretical explanations come from finance literature. See generally James 
R. Booth & Richard L. Smith III, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification 
Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261 (1986); Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 
J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1986); Seha M. Tiniç, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common 
Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1988).  However, the legal literature has addressed the issue as well. See, 
e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 17–22; Yoram Barzel et al., Prevention Is Better than Cure:  
The Role of IPO Syndicates in Precluding Information Acquisition, 79 J. BUS. 2911, 2911–13 
(2006); Barondes & Sanger, supra note 81, at 16–21; Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling 
Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 649, 649–51 (2007); Spindler, 
supra note 12, at 15–16. 
 135. See generally Murat M. Binay et al., The Role of Underwriter-Investor Relationships 
in the IPO Process, 42 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 785 (2007). 
 136. See Tiniç, supra note 134, at 789–95, 803–15 (explaining the liability theory and 
testing it empirically). 
MCCLANE FLR 2015 FINAL.DOCX 10/4/2015  11:48 AM 
132 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
generally seen as a transfer of value from the issuing company, which 
receives a lower price for the stock than it otherwise could, to the initial 
investors (and indirectly the investment banks), who realize the gain.  Thus, 
while underpricing might be necessary, the issuer would seek to keep it at a 
minimum, where the underwriter would seek to maximize it in the pricing 
negotiation. 
Most relevantly, various studies have investigated whether different 
attributes of the major players in the IPO process are related to the level of 
underpricing.  A number of studies have found an association between 
greater underwriter reputation and lower levels of underpricing.137  At the 
same time, one prominent study found the opposite to be true, particularly in 
offerings of smaller issuers.138  Another set of studies examined IPO auditors, 
finding that greater auditor reputation and level of compensation were 
strongly associated with lower levels of underpricing.139  Of those, a few 
have looked at the relationship of counsel in the deal and the existence and/or 
degree of underpricing. 
Studies of the relationship between legal counsel and underpricing have 
presented a mixed picture.  One study examined the relationship of the 
issuer’s counsel’s reputation, measured by level of compensation, and found 
a correlation between counsel with a good reputation and lower levels of 
underpricing.140  The explanation for this is thought to be either that better 
counsel help the issuer to be more aggressive in its negotiations and advocate 
for more positive disclosure in the prospectus, or that they provide quality 
assurance to the underwriters, or both.141  Another study examined the impact 
on underpricing of the experience level of underwriter’s counsel, using a law 
firm’s market share within its particular geographic area to determine 
experience level.142  This study found a strong negative correlation between 
the experience level of the manager’s counsel and the level of upward price 
adjustment from the initial offering range.  Those authors theorize that this 
effect is the result of more experienced counsel’s ability to require more 
negative disclosure about an issuer in the preliminary and final prospectus, 
because this disclosure is the primary basis for the bank’s marketing efforts, 
which in turn affects the final price.143  These authors cite previous studies 
 
 137. See, e.g., Carter & Manaster, supra note 73, at 1046; Barondes & Sanger, supra note 
81, at 16–21. 
 138. See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 12, at 11–12, 30–31. 
 139. See Beatty, supra note 73, at 693–709; Randolph P. Beatty, The Economic 
Determinants of Auditor Compensation in the Initial Public Offerings Market, 31 J. ACCT. 
RES. 294, 294–300 (1993). 
 140. Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 561, 596.  For a study on the relationship between 
IPO market share by bank and announcement of an investigation by the SEC, see generally 
Beatty et al., The Indirect Economic Penalties in SEC Investigations of Underwriters, 50 J. 
FIN. ECON. 151 (1998). 
 141. See Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 595–97. 
 142. See Barondes & Sanger, supra note 81, at 2–3, 19–21. 
 143. See id. 
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showing upward price adjustment as correlated with underpricing to 
conclude that high-experience law firms help to create less underpricing.144 
In order to separate what might be considered positive implications of 
underpricing from negative ones, as well as to isolate the impact of 
familiarity among the parties, it is necessary to analyze (1) what elements of 
the first day bounce data would be consistent with a deal that performs well 
and inconsistent with pricing error or agency problems between the 
underwriter and issuer, and (2) whether either of the above can be explained 
by experience or quality of the lawyers or underwriters, as opposed to factors 
related to the interactions between the lawyers and bankers.  The following 
sections perform this analysis, revealing both inconsistencies with the 
underpricing explanation and strong indications of a well-performing deal. 
a.  Upward Price Correction 
To test whether the first day bounce is more consistent with good 
performance versus error or lack of independence, I look at the propensity 
for accurate upward price revision between the initial offer range and the 
offering price in the presence of high levels of underpricing, when lawyers 
and managing underwriters have worked together more frequently.  A greater 
propensity for correct price revision linked to counsel’s interaction with the 
underwriter would indicate lower error rates, and possibly greater 
independence on the part of counsel, because the underwriter typically 
prefers to keep the price down and benefits less from revising up.145 
To examine this, I first construct two measures of strong performers, or 
companies whose stock price after thirty trading days is at least 20 percent 
and 30 percent higher, respectively, than the midpoint of their filing price 
range (controlling for the performance of the S&P Index during the same 
thirty days).  The reason for doing this is to find issuances that clearly exceed 
the level of underpricing for new issues that would be intended and 
advertised by a typical underwriter (usually 15 to 20 percent) and therefore 
should presumably have had an upward price revision if the price is to remain 
at 15 to 20 percent below the “correct” level.  I then calculate the probability 
of an upward price revision occurring before the deal closes for those deals 
in which the bank and counsel have worked together frequently and for those 
deals in which the bank and counsel have not worked together frequently.  
For this analysis, banks and counsel are considered to have worked together 
frequently if they have worked together at least three times in the preceding 
two years.  If the first day bounce associated with repeated interactions is the 
result of greater error rates, or an intentional scheme to price at a low level, 
 
 144. See id.; see also Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings 
and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 231–36 (1993). 
 145. A possible contrary interpretation would be that repeated interactions cause the 
underwriter to be less effective when negotiating the price with the issuer.  However, as 
explained below in the discussion of integer versus decimal pricing, this interpretation is 
unlikely. 
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one should expect the probability of an upward revision to be lower when the 
bank and counsel have worked together more frequently.  However, the 
analysis shows the opposite.  Figure 3 shows these probabilities in the raw 
data. 
 
Figure 3:  Upward Price Revisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 3 shows, there is greater propensity for upward price correction, 
and efforts to reduce underpricing, when banks and their lawyers are frequent 
collaborators.  When banks and their counsel do not work together often, 
upward price revision occurs a little more than 45 percent of the time.  
However, when the two are frequent collaborators, the probability is nearly 
60 percent. 
To measure this effect precisely, I employ a probit regression to determine 
whether the offering price was revised upward past the maximum of the 
initial offer range for the sample of issues that showed a significant increase 
in value (20 percent and 30 percent above the upper filing range on the 
thirtieth trading day, controlling for S&P returns during that time period).  
Panel A of Appendix Table 3 shows the results of the probit regression 
(marginal effects are reported).  Frequent collaborators are 8 to 9 percent 
more likely to correctly revise the filing price upward past the high end of 
the initial offer range for strong performers.146   This finding in turn further 
supports a conclusion that relational dynamics between the underwriter and 
its counsel improve the deal. 
 
 146. Other studies that examine price revision typically measure from the midpoint of the 
initial offer range. See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34.  The measures 
employed in my study are intentionally conservative, to err on the side of caution.  Employing 
the methodology used in other studies would have made the results in this specification appear 
stronger. 
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I note that an alternative possible interpretation posited in the literature is 
that price revision in fact represents lower levels of due diligence by the 
underwriter and counsel prior to the offering.147  Scholars advancing this 
interpretation reason that pricing can be done one of two ways:  through pre-
offering information discovery (via due diligence) or through bookbuilding, 
during which investors convey pricing information to the issuer and 
underwriters by means of the demand they express for the stock.148  Some 
scholars posit that there is a tradeoff between due diligence-related ex ante 
pricing and ex post price discovery through bookbuilding.149  If enough 
information is available to price the stock before bookbuilding, then the 
disclosure will be more informative and there will be a lower incidence of 
price revision during bookbuilding.150  Likewise, if less diligence is 
conducted, then disclosure will be less informative and use more boilerplate 
language, resulting in the need to rely on the bookbuilding process for price 
discovery and leading to more price revision.151  It is beyond the scope of 
this Article to analyze the plausibility of this interpretation in detail.  
However, I note that even if this interpretation is correct, it would support 
the conclusion that the underwriter’s counsel are doing an increasingly good 
job for the underwriter with repeated representations.  This is because the 
underwriter, if given a choice, would prefer to allow for price discovery ex 
post through bookbuilding over conducting costly and time-consuming 
research ex ante.152  From the underwriter’s perspective, this is a more 
efficient outcome because the underwriter expends fewer resources, but is 
still just as well off, if not better off, because it does not suffer ill effects from 
underpricing (and may even benefit from it). 
b.  Isolating the Effects of Interaction from  
Experience or Reputation 
To test whether the results with respect to price performance could be 
driven by the experience or reputation of counsel or the underwriters, I 
construct variables to account for the experience of both as signaled by the 
number of deals done in a given industry and within a given time period.  I 
also create variables to represent the market share of each bank and firm 
during the year preceding any particular deal, to provide a measure of the 
prestige of each firm.  I use these variables in the regressions specified above 
to see if they impact the result, and find that they do not.  These results are 
reported in Appendix Tables 7, 8, 11, and 12.  That measures of both bank 
and law firm experience, as well as measures of reputation as proxied by 
market share, do not change the estimates in the model strongly indicates that 
 
 147. See generally id. 
 148. See generally id. 
 149. See generally id. 
 150. See generally id. 
 151. See generally id. 
 152. See generally id. 
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the results are not driven by experience and substantive skill, or by reputation 
and signaling effects with respect to either the banks or the firms.  This in 
turn provides support for the conclusion that relational factors resulting from 
repeated interaction drive the results. 
4.  Litigation 
The filing of securities litigation is a salient indicator of deal performance, 
particularly if it happens within a relatively short period of time following 
the IPO.153  Securities liability can arise for numerous reasons and does not 
necessarily indicate problems with the lawyers or their relationship with their 
clients.  Nonetheless, a systematic pattern of either increased or decreased 
litigation may indicate either weaker or stronger disclosure and deals. 
In order to examine whether interaction has any impact on litigation, I 
perform a probit regression on the occurrence of class action lawsuits within 
six months and within one year154 of an IPO for which the underwriter and 
the underwriter’s counsel were frequent collaborators.  While the timeframes 
are somewhat arbitrary, it is often the case that IPO-related class actions are 
filed within the first year.155  Controls are the same as those used in the 
previous regressions.  The results are shown in Panel A of Appendix B Table 
4. 
The regressions reveal no significant relationship between litigation and 
frequent interaction between the underwriter and its counsel within the 
preceding year.  The negative coefficient for class actions within six months 
indicates that, if anything, there may be a very small decrease in the 
probability of short-term litigation, but there is not enough of a relationship 
to draw any strong conclusions.  The lack of significant result remains for 
deals within the past two and three years as well.  The lack of relationship is 
noteworthy in comparison to the incidence of litigation seen in relation to 
other interactions, as discussed below. 
Before concluding the analysis of litigation as well as short-term price 
performance, I should note another prominent, but unlikely, theory of 
underpricing that could affect the interpretation.  This theory explains 
underpricing as a form of insurance against IPO-related litigation.156  To 
understand why this might make sense, consider that section 11 of the 
 
 153. Class actions were filed within one year with respect to 119 of the issuers in the 
dataset, after discounting multiple separate class actions filed with respect to the same issuer.  
This number constitutes 4.36 percent of the dataset. 
 154. The six-month and one-year cutoffs are more conservative than those used in other 
studies of IPO litigation. See, e.g., Michelle Lowry & Susan Shu, Litigation Risk and IPO 
Underpricing, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 315 (2002) (analyzing the occurrence of litigation at any 
time after the IPO).  The six-month and one-year cutoff are used to ensure that litigation is 
related to the IPO, and in particular, the IPO-related work product that the lawyers would have 
produced. 
 155. See id. at 315 (discussing statistics on lawsuits filed). 
 156. See generally Tiniç, supra note 134 (originating the hypothesis that underpricing 
serves as insurance for litigation); see also Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309–11 (providing 
empirical support for the litigation insurance explanation for underpricing). 
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Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability for material misstatements in a 
prospectus that lead to losses by investors.157  Underwriting banks have been 
able to escape liability in such lawsuits by claiming that they conducted 
adequate due diligence and that statements in the prospectus were true to the 
best of their knowledge;158 however, issuing companies are not able to 
employ a due diligence defense and therefore bear strict liability for material 
misstatements that result in losses to investors.159  Liability under section 11 
is limited to the difference between the market price of the stock and the 
offering price.160  In practice, this means that an issuer faces potential liability 
any time its stock price drops below the offering price after the IPO, because 
even frivolous claims usually settle before the existence of any material 
misstatement or omission is ever adjudicated on the merits.161  With that 
danger in mind, issuers and their underwriters might use underpricing as a 
form of insurance against section 11 liability because if the offering price is 
low enough, it is very unlikely that the market price will drop below it.162 
If underpricing is insurance against litigation, then one might interpret the 
first day price jump results above, and the lack of any reduction in probability 
in litigation reported in this section, to conclude that frequent interaction is 
causing issuers to pay for costly insurance that is having no measurable 
effect.  This would, of course, indicate a negative outcome from repeated 
interactions. 
 
 157. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012). 
 158. See, e.g., Escott v. Bar-Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 688–89 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) (establishing the due diligence defense for non-issuer defendants in prospectus-related 
litigation if the defendant can show reasonable grounds for that belief after a reasonable 
investigation into the truth of the alleged misstatements). 
 159. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3). 
 160. See id § 77k(e). 
 161. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 35, 35–36 (2009) (noting that securities class actions almost 
always end in settlement regardless of the merits because “defendants, anxious to avoid the 
distraction of litigation, high defense attorney fees, negative publicity surrounding a securities 
lawsuit, and the specter of potentially bankrupting damages, may be willing to pay a 
‘nuisance’ settlement to make the case go away, even when they perceive the likelihood of the 
plaintiff succeeding at trial as rather low”).  The perception of high levels of frivolous litigation 
was one of the motivations behind the passage of the Private Securities Litigations Reform 
Act of 1995. Id. 
 162. The issuer and underwriters can be—and often are—sued under section 10 and Rule 
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with IPO-related losses. See id. 
at 41–42.  Damages for such actions are not limited by the offering price, but the issuer is not 
subject to strict liability for damages in such cases. Compare Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (holding that “§ 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] was addressed to practices 
that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent 
conduct alone”), and 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (providing for “damages caused by” reliance on 
material misstatements or omissions), with 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (providing for strict liability), 
and 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (permitting damages “not exceeding the price at which the security 
was offered to the public”).  I focus in this section on liability under section 11 of the Securities 
Act because that section is the primary source of liability for IPO firms, see Choi et al., supra 
note 161, at 41, and provides much of the rationale for the litigation insurance explanation for 
underpricing, see Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309–13. 
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However, while the underpricing-as-insurance argument makes logical 
sense, it is widely disputed, and a priori problematic for a number of reasons.  
First, there is evidence that underpricing leads to higher share turnover in the 
aftermarket as investors who bought early seek to make a quick profit by 
selling their cheaply purchased shares into the rising market.163  Higher share 
turnover in the aftermarket, in turn, is an input of increased litigation.164  
Therefore, underpricing may be just as likely to draw litigation as is it is to 
deter it. 
Second, and more significantly, using underpricing as litigation insurance 
does not make economic sense because it would be vastly more expensive 
than what would be warranted given the expected costs of IPO litigation.165  
This is because the costs given up by the issuer due to high levels of 
underpricing are likely to be much higher than the ex ante expected cost of 
litigation in most circumstances, even taking into account non-liability 
related transaction costs, such as the costs of counsel, reputational costs, and 
management’s time and energy costs.166   
Third, it has been widely noted that other countries with developed 
securities markets have far less securities litigation, and are much less 
plaintiff friendly, but still have underpricing similar to what is seen in many 
U.S. IPOs.167  Therefore, it is unlikely that the lack of any association 
 
 163. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum, 
and Lockup Expiration Selling, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 107 (2002) (describing this model as an 
alternative interpretation). 
 164. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 320–21.  Lowry and Shu use market turnover as 
an input into litigation risk. See id. at 321 (“Stock turnover, measured as the proportion of 
shares traded at least once during a given period, is also related to plaintiffs’ incentives to 
initiate lawsuits.  This is because shareholder damages are generally increasing in the number 
of shares traded at the allegedly misleading prices. . . .  Not surprisingly, sued firms have 
significantly higher turnover.”). 
 165. This point has been made by numerous critics of the litigation insurance hypothesis. 
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 19–20. 
 166. To illustrate, the average probability of class action litigation within the first year for 
all deals in the dataset is 4 percent.  The average payment for settlement of securities class 
actions is approximately $3 million. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 310, 315 (noting 
average settlement payment of $3.3 million in “lawsuit sample . . . of all firms that had an IPO 
between 1988 and 1995”).  Meanwhile, the average level of underpricing is closer to 20 
percent, which on average amounts to $39.4 million left on the table given the average deal 
size in the dataset (or $10.8 million in terms of median deal size in the dataset).  This means 
that underpricing would be the equivalent of paying roughly $10.8 million to $39.4 million to 
avoid an average expected litigation cost of $120,000 ($3 million * .04), making underpricing 
an extraordinarily high price to pay to avoid litigation cost, even accounting for reputational 
and other harms that result from litigation. See also Qing Hao, Securities Litigation, 
Withdrawal Risk and Initial Public Offerings, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 438, 454 (2011) (reporting the 
results of a recent empirical analysis showing no reliable relation between underpricing and 
subsequent litigation risk for U.S. IPOs from 1996 to 2005); Jay R. Ritter, Equilibrium in the 
Initial Public Offerings Market, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 347, 354 (2011) (“This lawsuit 
avoidance theory of underpricing has the problem that leaving money on the table is an 
incredibly inefficient way of deterring lawsuits:  The opportunity cost in foregone proceeds is 
$1 for what is at most a few cents of expected benefits.”). 
 167. See Ritter, supra note 166, at 354 (“[T]he litigation environment in the U.S. is fairly 
unique, yet the magnitude of IPO underpricing in the U.S. is not unusual.”). 
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between lawyer-client familiarity and reduction in litigation rates has any 
negative implications for the other results reported here. 
5.  Disclosure 
The amount of different types of disclosure in the prospectus does not, by 
itself, indicate a positive or negative outcome for the deal.  However, because 
disclosure is a facet of the deal most directly influenced by counsel, it is 
useful to analyze it, both to inform the other results and to provide some 
insight on the possible mechanisms at work in the results previously reported. 
Appendix Table 10, Panel A, shows the effects of repeated interactions 
between an underwriter and its counsel and risk factors.  The table 
demonstrates a significant effect from repeated interaction:  each additional 
deal together in the preceding year is associated with a 30 percent increase in 
the proportion of the prospectus occupied by risk factors.  For repeated deals 
in the past two years, the marginal increase is 20 percent, and for three years, 
it is 15 percent, all significant at the .1 percent level.168 
The content and impact of different risk factors vary, and so it is not always 
clear which party, if any, benefits from increased levels of such disclosure.  
On the one hand, it is potentially prophylactic against litigation.  On the other 
hand, it may lead to underpricing and even provide a roadmap for litigation.  
Generally speaking, the underwriter in a typical IPO tends to favor more 
negative disclosure than the issuer.  This is due to the fact that, unlike the 
issuer, the underwriter benefits from negative disclosure, as it gains 
protection from liability while suffering few of its costs, because it can 
benefit even if the offering price is negatively impacted.169  Therefore, from 
a better team dynamic between underwriters and counsel one would predict 
an increased proportion of negative to positive disclosure (estimated here as 
the share of the prospectus devoted to risk factors). 
Despite the ambiguity of the level of disclosure, given the lack of 
association between repeated interactions and litigation demonstrated in the 
preceding section, a tentative inference can be drawn that the increase in risk 
factor disclosure is beneficial.  The benefit likely inures to the underwriter 
more than the issuer, as the underwriter stands to lose less and gain more 
from underpricing and thus has a different cost-benefit analysis with respect 
to litigation risk. 
6.  Time to Deal Completion 
Repeated interaction reveals a small but significant positive effect on the 
length of time to complete a deal.  If repeated interaction and better teamwork 
yield positive benefits, one would expect efficiency and speed to be one of 
them.  Therefore, I test the data to see if repeated interactions between 
 
 168. Results for share of the prospectus devoted to MD&A were not significant and not 
reported. 
 169. See, e.g., Ritter & Welch, supra note 12, at 1810; see also Nocera, supra note 14. 
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underwriters and counsel lead to a decrease in the length of time that deals 
take.  As mentioned in the previous section, many factors could influence the 
timing of the offering, and some of those factors cannot be controlled for in 
a regression.  Therefore, while the lack of a trend would not necessarily be 
troubling, a general trend would provide further evidence of negative or 
positive effects from repeated interactions. 
I analyze the length of time between the date that Form S-1 is filed with 
the SEC and the offer date.  This time period is only a portion of the entire 
length of the deal, but it nonetheless must serve as a proxy because it is the 
only observable information regarding the length of time to complete the 
deal.  Because the timing of the deal may depend on market conditions in a 
relatively narrow stretch of time leading up to the offering, I construct a 
dummy variable for each quarter of the IPO year, instead of using the entire 
year variable as in other regressions.  In addition, the number of lead 
managers in the deal have a significant impact on deal length (each additional 
manager increases the deal length by approximately six days), so the 
managers are added to the group of controls.  In my preferred specification, 
I limit the analysis to deals that are completed within one year, because the 
presence of a number of long-dated deals in the dataset raises the possibility 
of overstating the true effect of repeated interactions.  The results are reported 
in Panel A of Appendix Table 5. 
The results of the analysis indicate a modest but significant reduction by 
almost two days in the amount of time to complete a deal, for each repeated 
interaction within the past year.  This effect fades in both magnitude and 
significance for repeated interactions within two and three years.  In general, 
however, the trend supports the idea that better teamwork produces better 
results. 
7.  Integer Versus Decimal Pricing 
The type of price arrived at likewise indicates positive benefits for the 
underwriter from repeated interaction with its counsel.  Other research on 
IPOs hypothesizes that if an IPO is priced using a non-integer number then 
the issuer’s management team had more information and negotiated more 
effectively over price than might otherwise be the case.170  The reason for 
this conclusion is that arriving at whole numbers in a negotiation suggests 
less thorough analysis of relevant criteria and more reliance on anchoring 
techniques.171 
Panel A of Appendix Table 6 reports the results of a probit regression 
measuring the change in probability of a non-integer price with repeated 
interactions.  The results show a small but significant effect, with each 
 
 170. See Daniel J. Bradley et al., Negotiation and the IPO Offer Price:  A Comparison of 
Integer Vs. Non-Integer IPOs, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 517, 518 (2004) (arguing 
that non-integer prices represent more negotiation effort and less uncertainty regarding 
offering price). 
 171. See id. at 528–29.  This methodology is borrowed from Bradley and his coauthors. 
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repeated interaction within the past year resulting in a 1.3 percent lower 
chance of the final price being an integer.172  Significance does not remain 
for interactions over two and three years.  Nonetheless, this may indicate a 
stronger negotiating position on the part of the underwriter, aided by 
assistance from familiar counsel. 
D.  Interactions Between Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel 
One might expect the lawyers on either side of the table in a capital 
markets deal to gain perhaps the most from repeated interaction.  These 
individuals encounter each other frequently, and a good working relationship 
can help them to work more effectively together.  Analysis of frequent 
interaction between sets of counsel, however, yields few significant results. 
1.  Price Performance 
As before, first day price increase is examined for counsel-counsel repeat 
interactions.  The results for first day price increase, reported in Panel B of 
Appendix Table 1, indicate a moderate but significant effect.  These 
significant but modest price gains are sustained over thirty, sixty, and ninety 
days, as reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 2 
2.  Price Revision 
I again examine the probability of correct upward price revision and find 
there is a weakly significant (at the 10 percent level) relationship between 
interactions and the probability of upward price revision when the first day 
bounce is 30 percent or more.  No other significant results are seen.  These 
results are reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 3. 
3.  Litigation 
Each additional interaction between sets of counsel is associated with a 
small (0.6 percent) but significant decrease in class action litigation filed 
within six months following the IPO offer date.  No significant relationship 
is seen when the time period is expanded to one year, as shown in Panel B of 
Appendix Table 4. 
4.  Disclosure 
Counsel deals together continue the trend of marginally increasing risk 
factor disclosure, as reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 10.  The degree 
of increase remains relatively constant regardless of whether the previous 
interaction has taken place in the past one year (19 percent), two years (17.3 
 
 172. Out of 2265 deals in the dataset, 383 (14.03 percent) came to a final price using a 
decimal number. 
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percent), or three years (15 percent).173  Once again, this result is obtained 
after controlling for factors that might otherwise influence risk factors or the 
riskiness of the firm overall:  the firm’s industry, the time period, the age of 
the company, the size of the company (measured by company assets), and 
the involvement of sophisticated venture capital investors.  This suggests that 
the inclusion of additional risk factors may be driven more by norms of legal 
practice with regard to prospectus drafting than by anything related to the 
deal itself or the parties at the table. 
As above, risk factors increasing while the probability of a securities class 
action either decreases or bears no relationship to risk factors, could indicate 
that the two sets of counsel, working together more frequently, are doing 
marginally better work and protecting firms from litigation (at least in the 
first six months). 
5.  Deal Timing and Integer Pricing 
No significant relationship was identified between deal timing and integer 
pricing, as shown in Panel C of Appendix B Table 5.  This was somewhat 
surprising, given that better team dynamics would presumably create a more 
efficient process.  However, the length of time a deal takes may be affected 
by many factors outside the lawyers’ control.  The timing of the deal is also 
usually managed by the underwriters more than other parties at the table, so 
perhaps it should not be surprising that counsel does not affect it.  Testing for 
integer pricing yields a marginally significant, but very small negative result.  
This result indicates that counsel pairs may have a very small effect on what 
kind of price issuers choose.  However, this result may also be an artifact of 
the reality that there are many counsel interactions and relatively few non-
integer prices in the dataset. 
E.  Interpretation of Results 
1.  Summary of Findings 
Taken together, the results above indicate some positive benefits of 
repeated collaboration between underwriters and their counsel, as well as 
between different sets of lawyers on opposite sides of a deal.  In particular, 
when the lead underwriter and its counsel have worked together frequently, 
deals tend to perform better in the short and long term, and they are less 
marked by signs of pricing error or excessively high, unmitigated 
underpricing.  While negative and risk-related disclosure increase somewhat 
in such interactions, there is no corresponding association with litigation in 
the first year, when IPO-related litigation is most likely.  The data also 
suggests that deals get done slightly faster.  Similar results are evident for 
deals in which both sets of counsel have worked together frequently, except 
 
 173. Each is significant at the 1 percent level.  Results for share of the prospectus devoted 
to MD&A were not significant and not reported. 
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that there is a small but significant negative marginal effect on litigation 
within the first year but there is no significant effect on deal timing.  This 
suggests that counsels’ relational dynamics in these situations improves the 
transaction by reducing uncertainty, the cost of information production, and 
lowering agency costs and transaction costs. 
With respect to the two sets of counsel, the results are more mixed.  First 
day price jump increases modestly in repeated interactions, indicating low 
levels of underpricing.  Nonetheless, no significant result is seen with respect 
to price correction.  This could simply be due to more accurate pricing to 
begin with, or it might indicate that repeated interactions between counsel 
have a relatively modest impact on the ability of the deal team to market the 
deal.  The price performance over the first thirty, sixty, and ninety days is 
strong, further indicating a good deal.  Repeated interactions are associated 
with lower probability of litigation, at least in the short term. 
2.  Caveats and Robustness Checks 
While the associations described above provide interesting insights, the 
regression analysis alone gives no assurance that some underlying factors are 
not driving the repeated selection of both the banks and the different sets of 
counsel, as well as the results.  For instance, the industry of the company 
going public, the size of the company, the time period of the IPO, or the 
recent experience of a particular law firm in a particular industry might all 
factor into the choice to use the same counsel for multiple deals in a given 
time period.  At the same time, such factors could influence the results of the 
deal, without regard to the effect of repeated interaction.  To conclude that 
repeated interaction is indeed driving the results, I must rule out the impacts 
of such factors as drivers of the results.  I employ a number of strategies to 
do so. 
As previously explained, to rule out the impact of time period and industry, 
I use year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the interaction of the two.  
In alternative specifications, I use a fixed effect for the quarter in which an 
IPO occurs, interacted with the industry of the issuing company.  In my main 
specification, I also use a fixed effect for each underwriter, with no 
significant change in the results.  In addition, there are several years in the 
dataset in which IPO activity, as well as several of the outcome variables 
analyzed in the paper, is especially high.  The years 1999 and 2000 have 
especially high numbers of IPOs (as well as repeated interactions) and are 
associated with very high levels of underpricing and litigation.  Although the 
use of fixed effects for these years removes the mean impact of these years 
on the outcomes, as a further test of robustness I remove all deals completed 
in these years from the data set completely, and the results remain. 
As discussed above, law firm experience and reputation are also unlikely 
to be driving the results.  When a control for law firm experience is used, the 
results remain unchanged.  In addition, if “law firm deals” is used as a 
dependent variable in the analysis, only a small benefit is apparent.  Further, 
the consensus among practitioners interviewed for the study is that the 
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markets do not consider the reputation of the law firms representing the 
parties in the deal when making investment decisions.  This may reflect that 
all of the firms who do IPOs are of sufficiently high quality, and therefore 
reputation does not matter.  But in any event, law firm reputation and 
experience do not explain the results. 
Nor is it problematic that issuers’ and underwriters’ choice of law firm is 
often based on either a previous relationship or recent experience doing IPOs 
in a given industry.  Indeed, that explanation would be consistent with the 
findings above, as well as other empirical research on clients’ choice of 
lawyers.174  It would be difficult to imagine how such previous relationships 
would be related to the outcomes analyzed herein, except through the 
relational effects I am studying.  With respect to the law firms’ recent 
experience and reputation, I employ several strategies to rule these out as 
confounding factors.  To rule out the possibility that law firm quality or 
experience is driving the result, I construct variables to represent the number 
of deals each firm has done in the previous one year, two years, and three 
years in each industry and overall.  These variables do not change the results 
when added to the model.  I also add fixed effects for certain law firms that 
appear most frequently in the dataset, and the results remain.175 
Finally, other factors that may influence selection of counsel, as well as 
the outcome variables, are factors related to the quality of the deal, 
availability of information about the issuer, and sophistication of the parties.  
These factors are:  the presence of venture capital or private equity investors, 
the age of the company (which impacts the amount of information available 
about the company), the value of the company in terms of total assets, the 
value of the company as determined by book value per share, the size of the 
underwriting syndicate, and the proportion of insider stock sold in the deal.176  
Including these factors in the model yields the same results as those obtained 
in my preferred specification.  All results discussed in the subsection are 
reported in Appendix Tables 7 and 8 for the first day price bounce and 
probability of litigation variables.   
To illustrate the point further, the results with respect to an issuing 
company’s counsel could be interpreted to suggest that some underlying 
factors are driving both underpricing and litigation risk, as well as the 
selection of counsel.  This explanation draws from theories of underpricing 
as both insurance for, and deterrent to, litigation previously mentioned.177  
 
 174. See Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1001. 
 175. In particular, Wilson Sonsini appears a disproportionately high number of times on 
the dataset (n=426).  Adding a fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini does not change the results.  
Removing Wilson Sonsini completely from the dataset lowers the precision of the estimates 
in the model such that they are no longer significant, which is to be expected when removing 
such a large number of data points.  Nonetheless the results remain even under that 
specification. 
 176. Recall also that deal size, measured by the log of gross proceeds, is a standard control 
in all specifications. 
 177. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309, 320–21; see also Alexander, supra note 12, 
at 19 (“A large literature has attempted to explain IPO underpricing.  One intriguing theory is 
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Under this theory, the level of underpricing might correspond to the litigation 
risk inherent in the issue, on the assumption that pricing lower would reduce 
the probability of the issuance being overpriced.  An overpriced issue draws 
more litigation because when the price inevitably falls in the market, 
investors lose money and often will bring suit.  Moreover, where there is 
inherent uncertainty regarding the issuer’s valuation or industry, 
underpricing may further help to mitigate the associated risks.178 
The tests described here make this interpretation unlikely, because if this 
story were true, one would expect to see the underpricing and litigation 
effects disappear when controlling for factors that would ex ante impact the 
risk of litigation for a particular firm.  However, that result is not observed.  
The systematic incremental nature of the results (i.e., that each additional 
interaction is associated with an incremental increase in underpricing and 
litigation on average) also makes it unlikely that there is an underlying factor 
driving the results as well as the selection of counsel.  In order for such 
underlying factors to be at work, it would have to be true that the parties 
selecting members of the deal team are doing so based on a very accurate 
prediction of the future levels of underpricing and litigation.  This would 
mean not only systematically predicting the level of underpricing and 
litigation with a high degree of accuracy, but also choosing different counsel 
and banks to work together and across the table from each other a specific 
number of times based on the specific prediction for each deal.  As discussed 
above, that scenario is extremely unlikely, especially once other possible 
confounding factors are controlled for. 
III.  DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The findings above indicate that the frequency of lawyer-client interaction 
plays a significant role in the quality of IPO deal outcomes.  This has 
implications for how deals are currently structured and the lawyers’ 
conception of their role as both team member and agent.  Specifically, these 
findings have implications for the role of teamwork in deal making and the 
principal-agent tension between lawyers and their clients. 
A.  Lawyers, Clients, and Teamwork 
1.  Importance of Teamwork for Deal Lawyers 
IPO transactions can fairly be described as team production endeavors, 
although teamwork is all too rarely considered in legal theory or practice.179  
 
that IPOs are underpriced as a form of insurance against legal liability based on claims of 
federal securities law violations on the offering.”). 
 178. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 18–20 (explaining the litigation theory). 
 179. Some excellent examples do exist, however. See, e.g., Utset, supra note 3, at 275–80; 
see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 247–55 (1999) (describing corporate outputs as the products of team, 
rather than principal-agent efforts). 
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Teams in the legal context can be defined, borrowing from social science, as 
a bounded social system whose members are interdependent and whose 
members are working toward a shared purpose.180  The benefits of teamwork 
over individual effort have been well documented.181  Despite this fact, and 
the prevalence of team tasks in the practice of law, the profession is only 
beginning to provide the necessary attention to relational skills or to the 
systematic study of a matter of theoretical importance or skills training.  
Lawyers and their professional governance are more frequently analyzed 
through the lens of principal-agent theory,182 although an equally appropriate 
lens would be that of team production theory in certain instances.  This is 
especially true when lawyers are engaged in capital markets deals.  While the 
lawyer-client relationship has principal and agency features, the lawyer in 
such situations does not simply await orders from the client to act upon; the 
lawyers help to shape those wishes by conveying advice and information 
about what is appropriate and wise in a given context.183  They often help to 
prompt the client to action and inform them about what they should be doing 
at a given point in time in the deal.184 
Relationships and repeated interactions play a critical role in establishing 
good team processes.185  The relational dynamics emerging from repeated 
interactions have the capacity to produce significantly better team 
performance and, in theory, better output.186  One common feature of teams 
that perform well is familiarity among the team members and experience 
working together multiple times in the past.187  This point is illustrated in a 
study conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
showing that team functioning, rather than mechanical problems or technical 
ability of individual pilots, is the key cause of most airline accidents.188  This 
 
 180. See Alchian and Demsetz, supra note 10, at 777. 
 181. See, e.g., JACK D. OSBORN ET AL., SELF-DIRECTED WORK TEAMS:  THE NEW AMERICAN 
CHALLENGE (1990); see also Paul Osterman, Supervision, Discretion, and Work Organization, 
84 AM. ECON. REV. 380, 380–84 (1994). 
 182. See, e.g., Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 331–34 (analyzing the tension between 
lawyers as agents and their clients as principals). 
 183. See Blair & Stout, supra note 179, at 259 (“[P]art of the agent’s job is to figure out 
what needs to be done (a situation we suspect is the norm rather than the exception in most 
public corporations).  A related point is that the principal-agent model assumes that it is clear 
who the principal is and who the agent is in the particular relationship or transaction under 
study.  Yet many of the most important relationships inside corporations may be more 
ambiguous, in the sense that both parties may be contributing productive inputs and neither 
may have authority over the other.”). 
 184. This point will be familiar to many who have practiced in capital markets and was 
confirmed by practitioner interviews. 
 185. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 81 (“In that sense, team cognitive structures, 
emergent states, and routinized behavior patterns are the echoes of repeated process 
interactions and, hence, are indicative of the nature and quality of dynamic team processes.”). 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. (“[R]epeated interactions among individuals that constitute processes tend to 
regularize, such that shared structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent 
process interactions.  Process begets structure, which in turn guides process.”). 
 188. See Robert L. Helmreich, On Error Management:  Lessons from Aviation, 320 BMJ 
781, 781–85 (2000); J. Bryan Sexton et al., Error, Stress, and Teamwork in Medicine and 
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study highlights a fact which is born out in NTSB statistics:  that 73 percent 
of accidents in its database occurred on a crew’s first day flying together, and 
44 percent of those accidents happened on the crew’s very first flight.189  
Research on airline crews and teams of doctors further shows that 
experienced teams who have worked together in the past perform 
significantly better—even when fatigued—than do rested crews who have 
not worked together before.190  Relational benefits translate to deals as well.  
Parties involved develop trust and learn each others’ norms for 
communication, language coding, risk tolerance, preferences, preferred roles, 
strengths, weaknesses, and working styles.191  As lawyer and client come to 
better understand each other, the lawyer is more able to anticipate his or her 
client’s needs, negotiating positions, and areas of focus.192  The lawyer can 
act as a better agent in managing the transaction and in dealing with the issuer 
and its counsel in the conduct of due diligence and disclosure drafting.  The 
client, in turn, is freer to engage in the business-oriented side of the deal, with 
an informational and legal product that matches its expectations and needs. 
2.  Making the Whole Better than the Sum of Its Parts 
While good teamwork can be beneficial, it does not necessarily appear 
spontaneously, and optimal team dynamics must be cultivated.  Team efforts 
are generally found to be better than individual ones, but it is not always the 
case that teams produce gains exceeding those of the sum of their parts.193  
Groups can suffer from process losses, such as coordination, and motivation 
problems can erode the benefit of team effort.194  This reality has been born 
out in experiments comparing actual teams and “nominal” teams (teams that 
never work together but whose output is constructed by aggregating the 
output of each individual) in the performance of a given task.195  In many of 
these experiments, adding the output of members of the nominal team 
produces results that are as good as or better than those obtained by the actual 
teams.196  This research suggests that teams do not automatically get better 
 
Aviation:  Cross Sectional Surveys, 320 BMJ 745, 745–49 (2000); see also Kozlowski & Ilgen, 
supra note 84, at 86–87 (explaining an experiment where teams were given the task of creating 
origami birds and became more efficient when they repeated the task together, but less 
efficient when members of the team were replaced with new members). 
 189. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 250. 
 190. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 77–81. 
 191. See id. at 84 (“[W]e conclude that a shared team mental model that captures the 
structure of relations among key aspects of the team, its task and role system, and its 
environment is a key emergent cognitive structure that shapes coordination processes relevant 
to team goals and their accomplishment.”); see also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 17–19 
(discussing the importance of coordination among deal team members and the need to have a 
common understanding of the tasks to be accomplished). 
 192. See id. 
 193. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 249–50. 
 194. See generally IVAN D. STEINER, GROUP PROCESS AND PRODUCTIVITY (1972). 
 195. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 246. 
 196. Id. 
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results simply by virtue of being a team.197  Repeated interaction appears to 
aid team dynamics over time, but other useful team skills may be less 
intuitive.198  Creating an effective team requires certain conditions to be met, 
and the presence of those conditions will increase the likelihood that a team 
will function well.199  In addition, research suggests that collaboration among 
lawyers may become harder to achieve when the lawyers face performance 
pressure, or when a client situation is perceived to be high stakes.200  An IPO 
can easily become such a situation.  It is worth considering how to improve 
upon lawyers’ relational skill to avoid some of these problems.  Best 
practices, including relatively simple but effective interventions such as 
appointing a definite leader, clearly defining roles, explicitly expressing 
norms of behavior, and setting concrete expectations can improve 
collaboration but do not necessarily happen naturally.201  In addition, further 
research would be useful to discover how lawyers might be able to foster 
better collaboration and leverage some of the benefits of familiarity, even 
without the benefit of repeated interactions with other lawyers or clients.  For 
example, a more intentional focus on group processes and communication 
norms might lead to better group interaction without having to learn by trial 
and error.  Moreover, learning to recognize and diagnose group process 
problems early on might lead to better collaboration even without repeated 
interactions. 
That relational skill can have such a large impact on a transaction implies 
that collaboration and teamwork should be further addressed in the legal 
profession in order to garner more of its benefits.  It is often assumed that 
members of teams do not require any particular additional skills to be 
effective team members.202  That is rarely the case.  This may be especially 
true for individuals trained as lawyers, given the individualistic nature of 
many of the pursuits that gain recognition in legal education.203  If it is true 
that relational skill and effective teamwork can have a significant and 
tangible impact on the substantive outcomes of a business transaction, then 
relational skill should be added alongside technical knowledge of regulation 
and value creation in the set of tools important to transaction cost 
engineering.  It is worth considering how a lawyer’s team management and 
process management skills come into play in this context and how they might 
be honed and enhanced. 
 
 197. Id. at 254. 
 198. Id. at 249–50 (discussing elements of high performing teams that are not necessarily 
intuitive). 
 199. Id. at 248. 
 200. See Heidi K. Gardner, Effective Teamwork and Collaboration, in MANAGING TALENT 
FOR SUCCESS 145, 145–46 (Rebecca Normand-Hochman ed., 2013) (discussing research 
indicating that lawyers become less creative, and more risk averse and less likely to 
collaborate, when they perceive the stakes to be high). 
 201. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 254–56. 
 202. Id. at 254. 
 203. See id. (noting that individualistic work cultures may not readily lend themselves to 
collaboration). 
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In addition to familiarity and repeated interaction, research has identified 
conditions which facilitate effective collaboration and without which 
collaboration rarely yields results better than what individuals can do on their 
own.  These conditions include:  setting clear boundaries for group 
membership and involvement, ensuring that team members have a clear idea 
of the team’s goals and direction, allowing individuals’ various levels of 
expertise to be leveraged, providing clear norms of conduct, and providing 
ample opportunities for feedback and direction on the group’s processes.204  
While these conditions may seem simple, they are often overlooked.  In 
addition, many groups harbor incorrect assumptions about what makes 
teamwork successful.  One such assumption concerns the roles of team 
leaders.  While leaders are important for setting direction, it is typically better 
for leaders to set up the conditions that facilitate team functioning, as opposed 
to being overly directive, or overly hands-off.205  Another commonly held 
assumption is that contrarian attitudes are corrosive to team behavior.  While 
someone who is overly averse to teamwork may be ill-suited for group work, 
groups tend to function best when they have a member who challenges group 
assumptions and orthodoxies.206  Without the voice of dissent, groups can 
become mediocre, and fall into patterns of groupthink.  The problem is that 
most participants in group work tend to shy away from challenging 
orthodoxies, believing that it will create conflict and disrupt the group 
dynamic.207 
These are just a few examples, and this Article does not purport to provide 
an exhaustive list of ways in which group processes can be tweaked so that 
deal teams can perform optimally.  However, the legal profession would have 
much to gain from further consideration of how to capture more benefits from 
group processes in deal making.  It is worth considering how such skills can 
be taught to practicing lawyers as well as law students.  At the very least, 
team skills should receive more emphasis and study than they currently do, 
and an awareness of relational dynamics should be incorporated into law 
school as well as continuing education curricula.  It is also worth considering 
how the incentive structures that exist in most law practices might be tweaked 
to reward team performance, as opposed to individual performance, such as 
billable hour targets which bear relationship to firm profitability in the short 
term without necessarily bearing any relationship to the lawyers’ ability to 
best serve clients. 
3.  Managing Drawbacks of Teamwork 
Group collaboration also deserves attention in the transactional context 
because of its potential to conflict with a lawyer’s agency duties.  The group 
 
 204. See id. at 264–66. 
 205. See id. at 265–66. 
 206. See Diane Coutu, Why Teams Don’t Work, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2009, at 99, 102–
05. 
 207. See id. 
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production task that lawyers are involved in when doing an IPO necessarily 
involves partisan interests.  So-called groupthink and other byproducts of 
team production may poorly serve clients whose interests diverge from those 
of others at the table.208  This may detract from the benefits of team 
functioning and undermine the lawyer’s central role as advocate for his or 
her client.  One means of managing the tension is to develop a better 
understanding of when the role of team member and agent are likely to come 
into conflict.  This in turn requires a better understanding of where parties’ 
interests might diverge. 
However, simply understanding where interests diverge is an incomplete 
solution.  Lawyers must know how and when to raise issues and not feel the 
pressure of the group to suppress concerns.  At first glance, it may seem that 
identifying divergence of interest might be antithetical to good team function.  
However, the ability to raise conflicts is an important component of team 
functioning, and finding ways to do so may in fact enhance team 
dynamics.209  Research on team dynamics suggests that one component of 
highly effective teams is a set of norms and practices governing dispute 
resolution.210  A more explicit understanding of the interaction between 
agency and teamwork and norms promoting productive avenues of dissent 
when necessary would allow deal lawyers to leverage team dynamics while 
still remaining zealous advocates.  Lawyers’ process expertise is particularly 
suited to designing and implementing such systems, and further education 
and research in this area would yield enormous benefits to transactional 
lawyers. 
B.  Recommendations 
If teamwork has its benefits, it may have drawbacks as well, particularly 
for the deal lawyer, who must balance the competing concerns of advocacy 
with the coordination and cooperation that facilitate deal making.  Simply 
working repeatedly with other members of a deal team is not enough to 
promote better deal outcomes, as demonstrated by the results for repeated 
interactions between sets of lawyers.  Leveraging the benefits of teamwork 
without sacrificing the duty of agency will involve more intentional 
consideration of both and a more complex model of the deal negotiations 
than is typically described.  I briefly describe some proposals here for how 
that could be done in the area of securities law and in legal professional 
education.  These are preliminary and require further research. 
1.  Securities Law 
One proposal that the empirical findings of this Article would seem to 
suggest is an update of the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act.  The 
 
 208. See Kozlowski et al., supra note 84, at 77, 81. 
 209. See PFEIFFER BOOK OF SUCCESSFUL TEAM-BUILDING TOOLS 247–65 (Elaine Biech, ed. 
2008); Hackman, supra note 6, at 255. 
 210. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 250. 
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findings provide empirical support for the proposition that disclosure does 
indeed matter to the markets, and if that is the case, it would seem that the 
prior relationships among members of the deal team are a factor to be 
considered when weighing what the disclosure says.  It may well be the case 
that the “reasonable” investor may not know or care about the effects of 
repeated interactions.  However, market analysts and others who provide 
them with information may find the disclosure more useful. 
2.  Education and Training 
Though other professions have embraced teamwork and collaboration as a 
crucial component of professional education, law has been slow to embrace 
it.  Business schools and medical schools routinely incorporate team tasks 
and skills training into their basic curriculum, based on compelling research 
that good teamwork fosters better results and poor teamwork fosters 
mistakes.  With respect to law, team skills are equally important.  While this 
is evident in the transactional context, in the litigation context lawyers 
frequently work in teams as well.  In fact, in a law firm practice of any size, 
lawyers  frequently engage in team tasks and could serve their clients far 
better if such tasks were optimally structured.  However, for lawyers, the 
team dynamic takes on additional complications for all of the reasons 
discussed in this Article.  This suggests that not only are team skills 
important, but so is the complex skill of balancing team productivity with 
advocacy. 
CONCLUSION 
To ask how lawyers add value is to miss half the equation.  In transactional 
practice, lawyers and clients add value by working together effectively to 
accomplish a common aim.  This Article provides evidence that repeated 
lawyer-client interaction leads to better substantive deal outcomes.  This is a 
conclusion that should come as little surprise, but it has not previously been 
documented to the same degree.  The results suggest that lawyers do their 
best work when they form effective teams with their clients because they 
establish trust and learn how to optimize their roles, communication styles, 
and preferences.  This is a natural product of repeated interactions, but it can 
also be enhanced by more intentional awareness of the importance of team 
dynamics.  Precisely how lawyers can work better with clients is an issue that 
warrants further study, but it is clear that lawyers would benefit if the issue 
were addressed earlier in their training and more directly.  Law schools 
currently lack much training relating to teams or managing group processes, 
a feature which puts law students behind peers in professions like business 
and medicine.  Moreover, these topics are virtually absent from continuing 
legal education.  Nonetheless, if lawyers are to be effective “transaction cost 
engineers,” these skills are essential, particularly at a time when the value of 
legal education is in question and corporate clients complain that lawyers 
lack value additive skills. 
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Appendix Figure A:  
 Summary Statistics  
 
  
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
Total IPO Deals 
 
     2,265   
 
 
Lead Underwriters 
 
      268        1.40           1.00            0.82 
 
 
Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together >1:  
Past 1 Year 
 
 
       955 
       3.30           3.00            1.95 
 
 
Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together >1:  
Past 2 Years 
    1,135         3.89           3.00            2.63 
 
 
Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together >1:  
Past 3 Years 
     1,231         4.24           3.00            3.07 
 
 
Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel 
Deals Together >1:  Past 1 Year 
      493         4.53           3.00            3.41 
 
 
Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel deals 
together >1:  Past 2 years 
      582         5.51           3.00            4.90 
 
 
Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel 
Deals Together >1:  Past 3 Years 
     639        6.18           4.00            6.18 
 
First Day Price Increase (percent) for all 
deals 
    2,725*         28%           11%           59% 
 
Log (gross proceeds) for all deals     2,725*      17.96         17.93          1.06 
 
Company Age (years) for all deals     2,265      12.80         7.00        18.21 
 
Syndicate Size (number of banks) for all 
deals 
    2,265        11.41          9.00         8.29 
 
* A number of deals involve more than one lead underwriter, which creates more observations than deals.  Observations are de-weighted 
accordingly to account for this. 
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Appendix Table 1:   
Opening Day Performance and Repeated Interactions 
 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level 
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced. 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Opening Day Price Jump % 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A:  
Lead Underwriter  
& Underwriters’  
Counsel 
 
Deals Together 
in Past Year 
 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.030* 
(0.012) 
    
Deals Together 
in Past 2 Years 
 
  0.033*** 
(0.007) 
0.019* 
(0.0078) 
  
Deals Together 
in Past 3 Years 
    0.0257*** 
(0.0057) 
0.014* 
(0.006) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
0.067*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.054*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.0668*** 
(0.0115) 
 
0.053*** 
(0.0156) 
 
0.0678*** 
(0.0116) 
 
0.053*** 
(0.016) 
 
R2 
 
0.232 
 
 
0.337 
 
0.230 
 
0.336 
 
0.228 
 
0.336 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
Panel B:  
Underwriters’  
Counsel & 
Issuer’s Counsel 
 
Deals Together 
in Past Year 
 
0.021** 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.008) 
    
Deals Together 
in Past 2 Years 
 
  0.017** 
(0.052) 
0.011 
(0.005) 
  
Deals Together 
in Past 3 Years 
    0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.009*  
(0.005) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
0.0695***    
(0.012) 
 
0.048** 
(0.016) 
 
0.071*** 
(0.0121) 
 
0.050** 
(0.0156) 
 
0.072*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.051** 
(0.015) 
 
R2 
 
0.223 0.335 0.224 0.335 0.225 0.34 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
IPO Year 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Industry*Year 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X 
Bank Dummies  X  X  X 
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Appendix Table 2: 
30, 60 & 90 Day Price Performance 
 
Dependent Variable:  Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index 
 
  30-Day   60-Day   90-Day  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A:  
Underwriters’  
Counsel &  
Managing  
Underwriter 
 
Deals 
Together 
in Past 
Year 
 
 
0.044*** 
(0.013) 
   
0.068*** 
(0.019) 
   
0.074*** 
(0.024) 
  
Deals 
Together 
in Past 2 
Years 
 
  
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
   
0.043*** 
(0.012) 
   
0.049*** 
(0.015) 
 
Deals 
Together 
in Past 3 
Years 
  
 
 
 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
   
0.034*** 
(0.012) 
   
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
 
R2 
 
0.120 
 
0.120 
 
0.120 
 
0.161 
 
0.159 
 
0.158 
 
0.160 
 
0.159 
 
0.159 
 
Number of 
Observa-
tions 
 
 
2,725 
 
 
2,725 
 
 
2,725 
 
 
2,721 
 
 
2,721 
 
 
2,721 
 
 
2,720 
 
 
2,720 
 
 
2,720 
 
Panel B:   
Issuer’s Counsel  
& Underwriters’  
Counsel 
 
Deals 
Together 
in Past 
Year 
 
 
0.022* 
(0.009) 
   
0.038* 
(0.016) 
   
0.041* 
(0.017) 
  
Deals 
Together 
in Past 2 
Years 
 
  
0.016* 
(0.007) 
   
0.030* 
(0.012) 
   
0.039** 
(0.013) 
 
Deals 
Together 
in Past 3 
Years 
   
0.013* 
(0.006) 
   
0.025* 
(0.010) 
   
0.034** 
(0.011) 
 
R2 
 
 
0.112 
 
0.118 
 
0.118 
 
0.161 
 
0.159 
 
0.159 
 
0.160 
 
0.159 
 
0.161 
Number of 
Observa- 
tions 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,721 
 
2,721 
 
2,721 
 
2,720 
 
2,720 
 
2,720 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
IPO Year 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
Industry*
Year  
Dummies 
X X X X X X X X X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, 
respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases. 
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Appendix Table 3: 
Probit Analysis of Upward Revision for Strong Performers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Upward Revision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 20% Bounce 30% Bounce 
 
Panel A:  Lead 
Underwriter & 
Underwriters’ 
Counsel 
 
Frequent Collaborator  0.270** 
(0.109) 
0.262** 
(0.113) 
0.231 
(0.124) 
0.224 
(0.129) 
 
Log Gross Proceeds 
 
0.582*** 
(0.078) 
 
0.597*** 
(0.084) 
 
0.486*** 
(0.910) 
 
0.485*** 
(0.100) 
 
Marginal Effect 
(frequent) 
 
0.093** 
(0.037) 
 
0.087** 
(0.037) 
 
0.079+ 
(0.043) 
 
0.078+ 
(0.045) 
 
Number of Observations 964 906 698 625 
 
Panel B:  
Underwriters’ 
Counsel & Issuer’s  
Counsel 
 
Frequent Collaborator  0.120 
(0.096) 
0.142 
(0.101) 
0.058 
(0.111) 
0.098 
(0.118) 
 
Log Gross Proceeds 
 
0.591*** 
(0.079) 
 
0.608*** 
(0.085) 
 
0.498*** 
(0.092) 
 
0.499*** 
(0.100) 
 
Marginal Effect 
(frequent) 
 
0.042 
(0.033) 
 
0.047 
(0.034) 
 
0.021 
(0.038) 
 
0.034 
(0.041) 
 
Number of Observations 964 906 698 625 
 
Industry Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
IPO Year Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Industry*Year Dummies  
 
X 
  
X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 
0.1% level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank 
is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced. 
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Appendix Table 4: 
Probit Analysis of Probability of Class Action Litigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Securities Class Action Litigation Filed 
 
                                                                             Within 6 Months                                                             Within 1 Year 
                                                                                of Offer Date                                                                 of Offer Date 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Panel A:  Lead 
Underwriter & 
Underwriters’ 
Counsel 
 
Deals Together in the  
Preceding 1 Year 
 
-0.002 
(0.039) 
 
0.022 
(0.038) 
0.003 
(0.027) 
0.003 
(0.030) 
Log Gross Proceeds 
 
0.237*** 
(0.057) 
0.291*** 
(0.081) 
0.254*** 
(0.469) 
0.300*** 
(0.030) 
 
Marginal 
Effect (of collaboration) 
 
-0.0007 
(0.002) 
 
0.0013 
(0.0022) 
 
 
0.0002 
(0.0023) 
 
0.0003 
(0.0029) 
Number of Observations 2,639 1,645 2,705 2,138 
 
Panel B:  
Underwriters’ 
Counsel & Issuer’s  
Counsel 
 
Deals Together in the  
Preceding 1 Year 
 
-0.120* 
(0.061) 
 
-0.113* 
(0.057) 
0.002 
(0.024) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
Log Gross Proceeds 
 
0.262*** 
(0.073) 
0.294*** 
(0.094) 
0.288*** 
(0.057) 
0.304*** 
(0.067) 
 
Marginal 
Effect (of collaboration) 
 
-0.005 
(0.002) 
 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
 
0.0005       
 (0.002) 
 
Number of Observations 
 
2,201 
 
1,404 
 
2,253 
 
1,850 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
IPO Year Dummies 
 
X X X X 
Industry*Year Dummies  X  X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, 
respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced. 
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Appendix Table 5: 
Time to Completion from S-1 Filing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Length of Time from S-1 Filing to Offer Date (in days) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A:  
Lead Underwriter  
& Underwriters’  
Counsel 
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
1 Year 
-2.52*** 
(0.916) 
-1.76*** 
(0.580) 
    
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
2 Years 
   
-1.80** 
(0.66) 
 
-0.883 
(0.490) 
  
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
3 Years 
     
-1.70*** 
(0.577) 
 
-0.75 
(0.427) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
-8.17*** 
(2.50) 
 
-9.73*** 
(1.50) 
 
-10.55*** 
(2.56) 
 
-9.83*** 
(1.50) 
 
-10.48*** 
(2.55) 
 
-9.83*** 
(1.50) 
 
Lead 
Underwriting 
Bank 
 
6.27  
(3.70) 
 
5.87***     
(1.99) 
 
5.53 
(3.07) 
 
5.97*** 
(1.99) 
 
5.54 
(3.07) 
 
6.01*** 
(1.99) 
 
R2 
 
 
0.38 
 
0.18 
 
0.25 
 
0.17 
 
0.25 
 
0.18 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,723 
 
2,651 
 
2,721 
 
2,651 
 
2,721 
 
2,651 
 
Panel B:  
Underwriters’  
Counsel & 
Issuer’s Counsel 
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
1 Year 
-0.794 
(0.583) 
-0.114 
(0.483) 
    
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
2 Years 
   
-0.590 
(0.429) 
 
-0.104 
(0.372) 
  
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
3 Years 
        
-0.622 
(0.344) 
    
 -0.184  
(0.300) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
-12.85***    
(2.71) 
 
-10.91*** 
(1.61) 
 
-12.86*** 
(2.72) 
 
-10.91 
(1.61) 
 
-12.85 
(2.71) 
 
-10.89 
(1.61) 
 
Lead 
Underwriting 
Bank 
 
7.29 
(4.98) 
 
5.99 
(3.22) 
 
7.25 
(4.97) 
 
5.99 
(3.21) 
 
7.26 
(4.97) 
 
5.98 
(3.21) 
 
R2 
 
 
0.21 
 
0.17 
 
0.21 
 
0.17 
 
0.21 
 
0.17 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,262 
 
2,209 
 
2,262 
 
2,209 
 
2,262 
 
2,209 
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Appendix Table 5 cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Length of Time from S-1 filing to Offer Date (in days) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
IPO Quarter 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Industry 
Dummies*  
X X X X X X 
IPO Quarter 
Dummies       
All Deals X  X  X  
Deal Length < 
365 Days 
  
X 
  
X 
  
X 
 
 
 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 
0.1% level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each 
bank is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.  
 
The sample for this analysis was limited to deals that are completed in 365 days or less from the filing of the S-1.  The reason for 
limiting the sample in this way is to give a more accurate picture of the effect of counsel interactions.  The majority of transactions 
in the dataset are completed within one year of filing of the S-1, and the presence of a number of outlier deals that took much 
longer than one year biased estimate of increased efficiency upward.  
 
In addition, as the dependent variable in this specification is a time period less than one year long, a quarter-year fixed effect is used 
instead of the IPO-year fixed effect used in other specifications. 
 
 
 
MCCLANE FLR 2015 FINAL.DOCX 10/4/2015  11:48 AM 
160 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
 
 
Appendix Table 6: 
Probit Analysis of the Effects of Interactions on Probability  
of Non-Integer Pricing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Non-Integer Offering Price 
 (1) (2) 
 
Panel A:   
Lead Underwriter  
& Underwriters’  
Counsel   
 
Deals Together in the 
Preceding 1 Year 
 
-0.062*       
(0.026) 
-0.064* 
(0.028) 
Log Opening Price  -0.486*** 
(0.079) 
0.508*** 
(0.081) 
 
Marginal 
Effect (of collaboration) 
 
-0.013**     
(0.006) 
 
-0.013**      
 (0.005) 
 
Number of Observations 
 
2,639 
 
2,604 
 
Panel B:   
Underwriters’   
Counsel  
& Issuer’s Counsel 
 
Deals Together in the  
Preceding year 
 
 
-0.071* 
(0.030) 
 
 
-0.075* 
(0.032) 
Log Opening Price 0.448*** 
(0.087) 
0.492*** 
(0.089) 
 
Marginal 
Effect (of collaboration) 
 
-0.015* 
(0.006) 
 
-0.015* 
(0.007) 
 
Number of Observations 
 
2,263 
 
2,199 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
X 
IPO Year Dummies 
 
X X 
Industry*Year Dummies  X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% 
level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is 
treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced. 
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Appendix Table 7: 
Alternative Specification—Opening Day Price Increase 
Outcome Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
  
Underwriter- 
Underwriter’s 
Counsel:  Deals in the 
Last 1 Year 
 
Underwriter’s  
Counsel and Issuer’s 
Counsel:  Deals in the 
Last 1 Year 
 
(1) Preferred Estimate—with standard controls (standard errors) 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.021** 
(0.007) 
 
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured by number 
of deals  
  
 
(2) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters:  more than 40 IPO 
deals  
0.029* 
(0.013) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
 
(3) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters:  more than 80 IPO 
deals 
 
0.041* 
(0.018) 
 
0.031 
(0.017) 
 
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured dollar 
marketshare 
  
 
(4) Controlling for Lead Underwriter dollar market share for IPOs in 
preceding year 
 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
 
(5) Limiting sample to banks with highest dollar marketshare for IPOs 
in preceding year 
  
 
Calibrating for law firm experience—measured by number of deals 
done 
  
 
(6) Controlling for number of IPOs done by law firm in the past 1 year   0.048*** 
(0.011) 
 
  0.027** 
  (0.011) 
 
 
(7) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 2 years  
 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
 
  0.029*** 
  (0.010) 
 
(8) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 3 years   
 
0.049*** 
(0.012) 
 
  0.029*** 
  (0.010) 
 
(9) Excluding Wilson Sonsini (outlier firm in number of deals; n=384) 
 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
 
  0.035*** 
  (0.012) 
 
Calibrating for Lead Underwriters’ use of “favorite” law firms  
  
 
(10) Removing Lead Underwriters’ most frequently used law firm in 
the dataset 
 
0.072*** 
(0.019) 
 
  0.031*** 
  (0.011) 
 
(11) Removing anecdotally reported “favorite” law firm-bank 
relationships  
 
0.053*** 
(0.012) 
 
  0.033*** 
  (0.009) 
 
Calibrating for availability of information about the Issuer/issuer 
risk 
  
 
(12) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in number of years since 
founding 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
 
(13) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the log of the number of 
years since founding 
 
0.048*** 
(0.011) 
 
  0.030*** 
  (0.009) 
 
(14) Controlling for the presence of venture capital investors prior to 
IPO 
 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
 
Altering year control categories 
  
 
(15) IPO quarter instead of year  
 
0.048*** 
(0.011) 
 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
 
(16) Removing the year 1999  
 
0.039*** 
(0.011) 
 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
 
(17) Removing the year 2000  
 
0.037*** 
(0.011) 
 
0.033*** 
(0.013) 
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Appendix Table 8: 
Alternative Specifications for Class Action  
Outcome Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
 
Underwriter- 
Underwriter’s 
Counsel:  Deals in the 
Last 1 Year 
 
Underwriter’s  
Counsel and Issuer’s 
Counsel:  Deals in the 
Last 1 Year 
 
(1) Preferred estimate – with standard controls (standard errors) 
 
 
0.0003 
(0.0029) 
 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured by number of 
deals  
 
  
(2) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters:  more than 40 IPO 
deals  
 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
(3) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters:  more than 80 IPO 
deals 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
 
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured dollar 
marketshare 
 
  
(4) Controlling for Lead Underwriter dollar marketshare for IPOs in 
preceding year 
 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.0002 
(0.003) 
 
(5) Limiting sample to banks with highest dollar marketshare for IPOs 
in preceding year 
 
  
Calibrating for law firm experience—measured by number of deals 
done 
 
  
(6) Controlling for number of IPOs done by law firm in the past 1 year   
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.0006 
(0.002) 
 
(7) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 2 years  -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
 
(8) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 3 years   
 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
 
-0.001  
(0.002) 
 
(9) Fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini (outlier firm in number of deals; 
n=384) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.003) 
 
-0.0004  
(0.002) 
 
Calibrating for Lead Underwriters’ use of “favorite” law firms  
  
 
(10) Removing Lead Underwriters’ most frequently used law firm in 
the dataset 
 
0.005 
(0.005) 
 
0.001 
(0.003) 
 
(11) Removing anecdotally reported “favorite” law firm-bank 
relationships  
 
 -0.001 
  (0.003) 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
Calibrating for availability of information about the Issuer/issuer risk 
 
  
(12) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in number of years since 
founding 
 
 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
(13) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the log of the number of 
years since founding 
 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
 
(14) Controlling for the presence of venture capital investors prior to 
IPO 
 
0.0005 
(0.003) 
 
0.0006 
(0.002) 
 
Altering year controls 
 
  
(17) IPO quarter instead of year  -0.002 
(0.005) 
  0.004 
  (0.003) 
 
(18) Removing the year 1999  
 
0.001 
(0.004) 
   
0.003 
  (0.003) 
 
(19) Removing the year 2000  
 
0.0003 
(0.003) 
   
-0.004 
  (0.004) 
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Appendix Table 9: 
Limiting to IOPs Managed by Largest Banks— 
Underwriter & Underwriter’s Counsel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Opening Day Price Jump % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Deals Together 
in the Past Year 
 
0.029* 
(0.013) 
 
0.041* 
(0.018) 
    
 
Deals Together 
in the Past 2 
Years 
   
0.019* 
(0.008) 
 
0.026* 
(0.011) 
  
 
Deals Together 
in the Past 3 
Years 
     
0.013* 
(0.0064) 
 
0.019* 
(0.008) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
0.049* 
(0.019) 
 
0.056** 
(0.0212) 
 
0.0487* 
(0.0192) 
 
0.055** 
(0.0210) 
 
0.0485* 
(0.0191) 
 
0.056** 
(0.0211) 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
IPO Year 
Dummies 
 
Industry*Year 
Dummies 
 
Bank Dummies 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
Manager>=40 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Manager>=80  
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
R2 
 
 
0.328 
 
0.325 
 
0.328 
 
0.322 
 
0.326 
 
0.321 
Number of 
Observations 
 
1,534 
 
940 
 
1,534 
 
940 
 
1,534 
 
940 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, 
and 0.1% level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint 
bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in such cases. 
 
The table above reports the results of OLS regressions testing the possibility that selection is driving the observed increase in IPO 
market performance in the periods studied.  The table reports tests using the main specification for the opening day price jump and 
repeated interactions between the Lead Underwriter and its counsel, but this time limiting the sample to banks that manage at least 
40 issues in the dataset (the top 18 banks), and to banks that manage at least 80 issues in the dataset (the top 7 banks). 
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Appendix Table 10: 
Negative Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A:  Underwriter  
& Underwriters’ Counsel 
 
Dependent Variable:  Proportion  
of Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Deals Together in 
Past 1 Year  
 
0.309*** 
(0.057) 
 
 
 
 
 
Deals Together in 
Past 2 Years 
  
 
0.200*** 
(0.040) 
 
 
Deals Together in 
Past 3 Years 
     
0.150*** 
(0.035) 
 
 
Industry Dummies 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
IPO Year  
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
Industry*Year 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
R2 
      
0.166 
     
 0.166 
    
 0.164 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,247 
 
2,247 
 
2,247 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% 
level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is 
treated as being a manager in such cases.  
 
 
Panel B:  Underwriter’s Counsel  
& Issuer’s Counsel 
 
Dependent Variable:  Proportion of Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Deals Together in 
Past 1 Year  
 
       0.190***  
 (0.043) 
 
 
 
 
 
Deals Together in 
Past 2 Years 
  
 
0.173***    
 (0.031) 
 
 
Deals Together in 
Past 3 Years 
           
 
0.151***      
 (0.024) 
 
Industry Dummies 
 
           X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
IPO Year  
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
Industry*Year 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
R2 
 
     
 0.163 
 
0.168 
 
0.171 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,247 
 
2,247 
 
2,247 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% 
level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is 
treated as being a manager in such cases.  
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Appendix Table 11: 
Lawyer Experience on IPO Deals— 
First Day Price Increase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Opening Day Price Jump % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Deals Done  in 
the Past Year 
 
0.0048** 
(0.0018) 
 
0.0044 
(0.0025) 
    
 
Deals Done in 
the Past 2 Years 
   
0.0028* 
(0.0011) 
 
0.0027 
(0.017) 
  
 
Deals Done in 
the Past 3 Years 
     
0.0022** 
(0.0009) 
 
0.0023 
(0.013) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
0.071*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.103*** 
(0.015) 
 
0.0720*** 
(0.0123) 
 
0.056*** 
(0.0155) 
 
0.0727*** 
(0.0123) 
 
0.104*** 
(0.015) 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
IPO Year 
Dummies 
 
Industry* Year 
Dummies 
 
Bank Counsel 
Dummies 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
R2 
 
 
0.22 
 
0.35 
 
0.22 
 
0.35 
 
0.22 
 
0.35 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,725 
 
2,719 
 
2,725 
 
2,719 
 
2,725 
 
2,719 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 
0.1% level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each 
bank is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.  
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions testing whether the results in the main specification are driven by the law firm’s 
level of recent experience (and thus are selection-driven).  Law firm experience is measured by the number of IPOs done by a 
particular law firm within the past 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years.  The number of deals is a variable constructed by looking at the 
number of IPOs done by the law firm in the relevant timespan prior to the offer date of every IPO that comprises an observation.  
Industry and year-fixed effects, as well as a fixed effect for the interaction of year and industry, are used to isolate the effect of 
lawyer experience regardless of industry and time period.  As shown, the effect of law firm experience in the recent past 
(accounting for industry and time period) is very small. 
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Appendix Table 12: 
Price Performance and Counsel Experience 
(by Number of Recent Deals) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index 
 
  30-Day   60-Day   90-Day  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Deals 
Done in 
Past Year 
 
 
0.0021 
(0.0035) 
   
 0.0090 
 (0.0060) 
   
 0.0071 
  (0.006) 
  
Deals 
Done in 
Past 2 
Years 
 
    
0.0014 
(0.0024) 
   
0.0054 
(0.0038) 
   
0.0055 
(0.0042) 
 
Deals 
Done in 
Past 3 
Years 
   
  0.0021 
 (0.0018) 
   
0.0054 
(0.0029) 
   
0.0053 
(0.0033) 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
IPO Year 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
Industry*
Year  
Dummies 
X X X X X X X X X 
 
Bank 
Counsel 
Dummies  
X X X X X X X X X 
 
R2 
 
    
 0.33 
       
0.33 
     
 0.33 
     
0.31 
     
0.30 
     
 0.31 
     
 0.271 
       
0.27 
      
0.27 
Number of 
Observa-
tions 
     
2,719 
       
2,719 
      
2,719 
    
 2,715 
     
2,715 
       
2,715 
      
2,714 
      
 2,714 
      
2,714 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% 
level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is 
treated as being a manager in such cases.  
 
